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C hapter
Introduction to Study
This chapter discusses general matters relating to EDI, including the defin­
ition o f EDI fo r  the purposes o f this study, the growth o f EDI, an d  the busi­
ness a n d  general audit impact o f  EDI.
INTRODUCTION TO EDI
Electronic data interchange (EDI) represents the application of computer 
and communications technology to traditional paper-based business 
processes, supporting innovative changes in those processes. EDI is the 
electronic exchange of business transactions, in a standard format, from 
one entity’s computer to another entity’s computer through an electronic 
communications network.
There is a special type of EDI called electronic funds transfer (EFT), a 
money transfer system that banking and financial institutions provide 
worldwide. This study considers EFT simply as the settlement of an EDI 
transaction. An example of a typical integrated EDI/EFT system for a pur- 
chases/payments system is set out in exhibit 1.1. This study concentrates 
on the upper portion of the diagram.
GROWTH OF EDI
EDI is not a new technology. The transportation and shipping industries 
were the primary users of EDI in the 1970s. EDI use has grown significantly 
in a number of business sectors in the past decade, and especially in the 
past five years. Appendix A discusses the history of EDI in North America.
Worldwide growth is expected to continue at a rapid pace1 for the fol­
lowing reasons:
1. For example, a survey discussed in EDI fo r  Managers a n d  Auditors, 2d ed. (Toronto: CICA, 
1993), stated that growth in Canada should continue at 25 to 30 percent a year for the next 
several years.
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Exhibit 1.1
Sam ple Integrated EDI/EFT System
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• EDI is a major component of electronic commerce, as it provides 
benefits that are not matched by electronic mail or fax.
• More entities are becoming aware of the significant benefits that 
EDI can provide.
• Large corporations continue to push EDI down to new suppliers, 
creating networks of trading partners.
• Hard-copy documents are being converted into standardized EDI 
formats, replacing fax or data entry with EDI-based systems.
BUSINESS AND GENERAL AUDIT IMPACT
The use of EDI has created a significant number of changes in the way 
commerce is conducted and has resulted in the achievement of a signifi­
cant number of benefits (this is discussed in more detail in chapters 2 and 
3). EDI technology is not, by itself, the driver of audit impact. Rather, new 
business practices that use technology to achieve shorter business cycles, 
lower the costs of inventory, or meet other business objectives require that 
the audit team update its understanding of the client’s business processes, 
assess the related risks (some of which may include technology-related
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risks), and determine how these will affect the audit plan. This is discussed 
in more detail below.
A client’s use of EDI may affect the auditor in varying degrees. Those 
auditors who are experienced in the use of computer-based auditing tech­
niques and testing computer controls will likely not be challenged by EDI. 
Those auditors who do not have expertise in this area may find that EDI 
does represent a significant challenge.
This study addresses a scenario in which EDI is fully integrated into the 
client’s business and application processes (see chapter 2 for further ex­
planation). The extent to which this scenario is applicable to the particular 
client situation and the auditor’s experience with tests of computer-based 
controls needs to be considered in developing the audit plan.
STANDARDS AND AUDIT CHALLENGES
EDI can be a culture shock for auditors.2 The change in business practices 
caused by the use of EDI significantly increases the dependence of orga­
nizations on computer-based information systems for essential operations. 
Paper documents are not likely to be available to auditors to provide evi­
dence of transaction initiation and authorization. To effectively plan and 
conduct the audit, auditors will therefore need to understand the flow of 
transactions and may want to gain an understanding of EDI controls. This 
is extremely important because, in interorganizational systems such as EDI, 
an employee in one entity may directly initiate a transaction in another 
entity, crossing both organizational and departmental boundaries.
Generally accepted auditing standards require that a sufficient under­
standing of the internal control structure be obtained to plan the audit and 
that, when control risk is assessed below maximum, sufficient audit evi­
dence be obtained through tests of control to support that assessment. 
They also require that sufficient appropriate audit evidence be obtained to 
afford a reasonable basis of support for the content of the report.
_____________ AICPA_____________
A sufficient understanding of the 
internal control structure is to be 
obtained to plan the audit and to 
determine the nature, timing, and 
extent of tests to be performed.
_____________ CICA_____________
CICA Handbook Section 5100, 
“Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards,” states: “A sufficient 
understanding of internal control 
should be obtained to plan the
(continued)
2. See Electronic Data Interchange an d  Corporate Trade Payments (Morristown, NJ: Financial 
Executives Research Foundation, 1988), p. 5.
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_____________ AICPA_____________
AICPA SAS No. 55, Consideration 
o f the Internal Control Structure 
in a Financial Statement Audit, 
separately states that “Assessing 
control risk at below the maxi­
mum level involves
• Identifying specific internal 
control structure policies and pro­
cedures relevant to specific asser­
tions that are likely to prevent or 
detect material misstatements in 
those assertions.
• Performing tests of controls to 
evaluate the effectiveness of such 
policies and procedures.”
Sufficient competent evidential 
matter is to be obtained through 
inspection, observation, inquiries, 
and confirmations to afford a rea­
sonable basis for an opinion 
regarding the financial statements 
under audit.
______________ CICA______________
audit. When control risk is 
assessed below maximum, suffi­
cient appropriate audit evidence 
should be obtained through tests 
of controls to support the assess­
ment.”
and
“Sufficient appropriate audit evi­
dence should be obtained, by 
such means as inspection, obser­
vation, enquiry, confirmation, 
computation and analysis, to 
afford a reasonable basis to sup­
port the content of the report.”
The auditor traditionally obtains some degree of assurance as to the 
occurrence of transactions from the existence of externally generated 
paper evidence. Electronic evidence, obtained from the client’s computer 
system, may not provide the same level of assurance as to authenticity and 
occurrence as does externally generated paper. Therefore, it is likely that 
audit efficiency would be significantly improved if control risk could be 
assessed below maximum, because this would allow the auditor to reduce 
the level of, but not eliminate, substantive testing. As will be discussed in 
chapter 5, the financial statement assertions that are most affected by EDI 
are the completeness, accuracy, and authorization of transactions. Chapter 
6 provides a discussion of some techniques that could be used.
There are new forms of evidence, such as VAN usage reports, that can 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of gathering audit evidence. Also, 
as discussed later in this study, EDI presents auditors with an excellent 
opportunity to employ continuous auditing techniques, on-line real time 
auditing tools and, potentially, new approaches to computerized tech­
niques.
Audit Issues Addressed in This Study
The following issues are the most significant in considering how an EDI 
system affects the planning and performance of a financial statement audit:
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• Knowledge of the business is crucial; this is addressed in chapter 4.
• A substantive-based audit may be less efficient, and a controls- 
based approach may be the most efficient basis on which to con­
duct the audit; this is discussed in chapters 4 and 5.
• There is an absence of paper for audit and legal purposes; the 
impact on the audit is discussed throughout this document and 
legal issues are discussed briefly in chapter 5.
• Many traditional audit techniques, such as third-party confirmation 
and vouching, may no longer be possible; this is discussed in 
chapters 5 and 6.
• Many audit assertions are directly affected; this is addressed 
throughout the study and, specifically, in chapters 5 and 6.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
There are a number of publications that deal with EDI, many of which are 
provided in the bibliography. Various articles also discuss this topic. The 
business and technology press is a continuing source of references.
C hapter
What Is EDI?
This chapter discusses how the EDI process works an d  provides an  example 
o f  a typical application.
THE EDI PROCESS 
Introduction
EDI transactions are transmitted either directly between the entities and 
their trading partners or through third parties called VANs (value-added 
networks) and public networks such as CompuServe, Prodigy, and the 
Internet. Many EDI networks were established on a proprietary basis 
among trading partners. The growing use of standards and VANs, howev­
er, has established an open architecture through which individual compa­
nies can link up with a growing community of users. The receiving entity 
can receive, validate, accept, and process information, provided it is in a 
standard format.
Documents in electronic format may be exchanged in other ways (for 
example, on magnetic tape or disk), and portions of this study may be 
applicable to such exchanges. They are not, however, included in the def­
inition of EDI as used herein.
EDI-Based Transactions
Although EDI can be appropriate for a wide range of activities, it is com­
monly used for purchasing, processing accounts payable, invoicing, and 
financial applications. In these systems, EDI replaces purchase orders, 
invoices, shipping forms, checks, bills of lading, and other documents with 
electronic transactions conforming to a standard format.
EDI may change an entity's work flow. Rather than processing a paper 
document, such as a purchase order, to initiate a transaction, trading part­
ners transmit business transactions through the EDI network.
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EDI Transmission Phases
The EDI transmission process normally involves three phases:
• The application interface involves passing the electronic transac­
tions to (or extracting them from) the appropriate business appli­
cation system (for example, accounts payable or receivable); it is 
the critical link between the EDI translator and the business’s own 
internal processing.
• The EDI translator involves formatting (or unformatting) the data 
into an agreed-upon EDI data format and passing them to the 
data communications interface; all transaction data must pass 
through this process to be sent from or received by the business 
using EDI.
• The communications interface involves the transmission and 
receiving of EDI documents electronically; it represents the media 
through which all EDI transactions pass.
A schematic example of a typical EDI system for inbound and outbound 
transactions is set out in exhibit 2.1.
Types of EDI
There are essentially two types of EDI implementation:
• Stand-alone EDI —  usually a small pilot project with microcom­
puter interfaces only. Transactions are often printed, manually 
reviewed, and rekeyed for entry into the application system. In 
this situation, there is little change in the work flow and, thus, lit­
tle audit impact.
• Integrated —  application-to-application EDI with integration of 
the receiver’s and sender’s computer systems (for example, order 
processing, fulfillment, and payment).
This study focuses on integrated EDI, although the discussions could be 
used, within context, in stand-alone applications.
Communications Interface Options
Communication is generally viewed as an extension of the client’s existing 
EDP capabilities; the difference between electronic communications and 
EDI is not in the technology but, rather, in the fact that —
• Part of the business transaction is initiated outside the client.
• The method of networking may affect/define the business rela­
tionships and partnering (see chapter 3).
As discussed below, EDI transactions can be transmitted either directly 
(point to point) or through a VAN provider or another network.
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Exhibit 2.1 
Sam ple EDI System
Acknowledgments shown by dashed arrows 
Message paths shown by solid arrows
TR: Application-generated transactions, 
for example:
(1) Requests for bids, purchase orders, 
change orders, payment/advice
OR
(2) Price lists and quotations, shipping 
advice or invoices
Acknowledgment Types 
1: Status of sender’s transactions 
2A: Receipt by sender’s mailbox 
2B: Receipt by recipient’s mailbox 
3: Functional acknowledgment 
4: Status of recipient’s transactions 
5: Action acknowledgment
P o in t-to -P o in t C onnection
Under this connection scheme, EDI partners establish a direct computer- 
to-computer link (a private network). Larger U.S. automakers and gov­
ernments have traditionally used this method. The advantages for the 
sponsoring organization include the following:
• The sponsoring organization controls the system; as a result, there 
is no reliance on third parties for computer processing.
• It allows the organization to control who has access to the net­
work.
• It allows the organization to use/enforce a proprietary software 
standard in its dealings with all trading partners.
Sender’s
Application
Recipient’s
Application
TR 1, 5 TR 4, 5
Sender’s 
EDI System/EDI 
Translator
If a Point-to-Point System
Recipient’s 
EDI System/EDI 
Translator
Communications InterfaceTR 2A, 2B 
  3. 5 
TR 3, 5
The Network
(assumes a VAN)
Sender’s
Mailbox
 2B, 3, 5
Recipient’s
Mailbox
10 AUDIT IMPLICATIONS OF EDI
• With the absence of an interim data handler, the timeliness of 
delivery can be improved.
Disadvantages include the following:
• There is a need to establish the point-to-point connection with 
each trading partner.
• It defines and restricts business relationships.
• There is a higher initial cost of communication channels.
• There are computer scheduling issues.
• There is a need for common protocols.
• There is a need for hardware and software compatibility.
V alu e-A dded  N e tw o rk  (VAN)
This type of network performs “store and forward” functions for the EDI 
trading partners. The sender transmits data to the VAN; that, in turn, deter­
mines the intended recipient for the transaction and places the data in the 
recipient’s mailbox. The data remain in the mailbox until the intended 
recipient retrieves the document. The VAN provides a cost-beneficial alter­
native to providing direct EDI connections with trading partners. This type 
of arrangement has a number of advantages:
• It reduces communication and data protocol problems, since most 
VANs have the appropriate facilities to deal with different proto­
cols; the fact that the sender and receiver are not directly con­
nected eliminates the need for them to agree on and implement 
a common protocol.
• The mailbox facility of the VAN allows one trader to deal with 
many partners without establishing numerous point-to-point con­
nections.
• It reduces scheduling problems, since sender and receiver do not 
directly communicate; the receiver can, at its convenience, 
request delivery of the information from the VAN.
• The VAN is more likely than an organization that runs a point-to- 
point system to provide a third-party report for its customers (pur­
suant to CICA Handbook Section 5900, “Opinions on Control 
Procedures at a Service Organization,” and AICPA SAS No. 70, Re­
ports on the Processing o f Transactions by Service Organizations).
• In some cases, the VAN provides value-added services, such as 
translating the application format to a standard format; the part­
ner sending the data does not have to reformat.
• The VAN can provide increased security as it contributes to 
authentication of sender and recipient and can act as a network 
“firewall” to protect the entity.
There are also certain disadvantages in using a VAN:
• The VAN charges are in addition to the communication costs.
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• The organization becomes dependent upon the VAN’s computer 
systems and controls.
• Because of the involvement of the VAN, there could be a loss of 
data confidentiality.
These are discussed in more detail in chapter 3.
P r o p r ie ta r y  N e tw o r k s
In some situations, such as health care and banking, industry-specific net­
works have been developed that allow the transmission of EDI transactions.
P u b lic  N e tw o r k s
The use of public networks such as CompuServe, Prodigy, and the Internet 
to transmit EDI transactions is an emerging new alternative to VANs and 
proprietary networks. The use of these networks for EDI exists but is not 
significant because of an overall lack of effective security for the organiza­
tion, especially in the case of the Internet.
This study will concentrate on point-to-point and VANs, as these are the 
most common.
USE OF STANDARDS
A standard is the common language spoken when dealing with trading 
partners, defining the format of the transaction and the way in which the 
transaction is communicated. It typically will be a generic, comprehensive 
protocol, agreed to by a sufficiently wide group of user corporations. 
Standards enhance development and growth and reduce overall cost. The 
two significant general standards in place are the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) X 12 and the United Nations/EDI for 
Administration, Commerce and Transport (UN/EDIFACT). At the present 
time, X12 is primarily used in North America, whereas EDIFACT is used 
for European and international transactions. This can create logistical 
problems for entities that use EDI in their worldwide operations. Further 
problems can be created if the entity is also in an industry that has some 
industry-specific EDI standards (such as the Uniform Communications 
Standards [UCS] for the grocery industry).
EDI standards define a transaction set (that is, a data format) for most 
common business transactions, such as purchase orders, shipping notices, 
receiving reports, invoices, and acknowledgments. Each transaction set 
contains defined detail data segments that correspond to the various types 
of information making up the business transaction, for example, date, 
name, and address; terms; and the specific details of the quantities, prices, 
etc. for each of the line items on the traditional paper-based form.
The ANSI X 12 and EDIFACT standards are compared/contrasted in 
appendix B. EDIFACT is expected to become the predominant standard for 
EDI. No new transaction types under the ANSI X 12 standard are expected 
to be developed after 1997.
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TYPICAL EDI SYSTEM
Configuration of a Typical Purchasing System
As discussed in the section “EDI Transmission Phases,” the EDI structure is 
composed of the application, translation, and communication interfaces. If 
one entity’s purchasing application identifies a requirement for another enti­
ty’s product because a particular inventory level has been reached, or if 
someone in the first entity’s production control initiates scheduled produc­
tion that requires these items, a transaction with the appropriate information 
will be passed to the EDI translation software. The process of selecting the 
appropriate data fields from the various application data bases and passing 
them to the EDI translation software is called “data mapping.”
Building a Transaction Set
An EDI exchange begins with the creation of a transaction set and related 
detail data segments by one of the trading partners. This usually is done 
by the programmed selection of relevant data items from application data 
sets. The transaction is then translated to a standard format. For a purchase 
order this would involve —
• Identification of those data items needed to build the standard 
EDI purchase order.
• Data extraction.
• Translation from the environment-specific data format to the stan­
dard format required, for example, by ANSI X12.
Building the Envelopes
The EDI translation software will build a transaction header and trailer for 
the transaction. The transaction header and trailer essentially define the 
beginning and the end of each transaction and provide summary informa­
tion that allows for the subsequent computerized checking of the transac­
tion set for accuracy at each stage of translation and transmission. They 
also contain the parameters that are important to message acknowledg­
ment by the trading partners.
The EDI translation software will also group together all of the purchase 
orders for a single trading partner and create a functional group header 
and trailer to form an electronic envelope. In general, the electronic enve­
lope contains one or more individual transactions (in this example, pur­
chase orders) that are combined into functional groups. Each functional 
group comprises one or more transaction sets of a like nature (for exam­
ple, purchase orders or receiving information) exchanged between trading 
partners in a single session.
The software will continue to build a structured train of transactions and 
identifiers by coupling all of the functional groups for the same vendor and 
placing interchange control headers and trailers at either end.
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Communications
Finally, the communications software uses a header and trailer to conform 
to the communications transport protocols necessary to transmit the mes­
sage electronically to the appropriate trading partner.
The communications software is responsible for sending and receiving 
the long trains of messages and determining if they arrived intact. The 
application program has as its eventual goal communication with the recip­
ient’s application software layer.
Exhibit 2.2 sets out the EDI standard electronic envelope using the ANSI 
X 12 standard.
Exhibit 2.2
EDI E lectron ic Envelope —  ANSI X 12 Standard
Communications Transport Protocol
Example:
Purchase
Order
Example:
Purchase
Order
Example:
Receiving
Advice
Interchange Control Header ISA
Functional Group Header GS
Transaction Set Header ST
Detail
Transaction Set DATA
Segment
Transaction Set Trailer SE
Transaction Set Header ST
Detail
Transaction Set DATA
Segment
Transaction Set Trailer SE
Functional Group Trailer GE
Functional Group Header GS
Transaction Set Header ST
Detail
Transaction Set DATA
Segment
Transaction Set Trailer SE
Functional Group Trailer GE
Interchange Control Trailer IEA
Communications Transport Protocol
C hapter
EDI Benefits and Exposures
This chapter discusses a n d  provides examples o f the benefits o f  introducing 
an EDI system into an  entity. Also discussed are the business exposures that 
an entity needs to be aware of.
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS?
The use of EDI has usually produced significant cost savings for the par­
ticipating entities (see exhibit 3.1 for discussion). As long as the technolo­
gy is properly implemented with adequate controls, a number of benefits 
have been attributed to the use of EDI, including —
• Quick response and access to information.
• Cost efficiency.
• Reduced paperwork.
• Accuracy and reduced errors and error-correction costs through 
elimination of the need to rekey information.
• Better communications and customer service.
• Ability to remain competitive.1
These are discussed in the paragraphs that follow.
Quick Response and Access to Inform ation
One of the most obvious benefits of electronic transmission of business 
data is the reduced time required to process a transaction. This allows the 
organization to react quickly to customer requests with prompt order 
processing/fulfillment. Transaction details are sent, received, evaluated, 
and processed in a fraction of the time usually associated with business 
processes. This also increases the flow of timely electronic data to man­
agement for analysis. 
1. A comprehensive survey of the benefits is set out in J. Hansen and N. Hill, “Control and 
Audit of Electronic Data Interchange,” MIS Quarterly (December 1989), pp. 403-413.
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Exhibit 3.1
Exam ples o f Benefits From  EDI
The following are examples of some of the benefits that have been obtained 
from EDI implementation.
(a) U.S. retailer J.C. Penney added more than $1 million to its bottom line 
in 1991 through savings achieved by using EDI. Through EDI transactions, 
the retailing giant saved $1 million on processing purchase orders alone and 
almost $300,000 on invoices.*
(b) Oil companies that have adopted EDI have typically cut administrative 
time by 50 percent, reduced administration cost by 30 percent, improved cus­
tomer service by 50 percent, and increased business volume by 20 percent. 
T. Don Stacy, chairman and president of Amoco Canada Petroleum compa­
ny, said, "Electronic data interchange has the potential to save our industry 
millions of dollars, something we desperately need right now."*
(c) Bedford Furniture was approached by Sears Canada in 1987 to imple­
ment EDI. One result was the development of "Hottruck," an EDI just-in-time 
program that allowed same-day deliveries and improved inventory control. 
In the three-year period following the introduction of Hottruck, Bedford did 
not miss a single shipping commitment. Without EDI, this program would 
not have been as successful.*
(d) The automobile industry was one of the early proponents of EDI and 
helped swell the number of EDI users by making adoption of EDI a criteri­
on for doing business with its thousands of suppliers. General Motors of 
Canada processes thousands of EDI transactions each day. GM sees many 
advantages:
• Cost-effectiveness: an EDI transaction costs only 13¢.
• Speed: EDI eliminates five-day mailing time for business documents.
• Reliability: transaction acknowledgments help ensure the delivery of 
information.
• Flexibility: EDI transactions are not restricted to a paper form -  infor­
mation may be added as required.
• Expandability: additional transactions can be easily added.*
In the United States, General Motors considered paper minimization a strong 
motivating factor for EDI introduction. Implementation began in its payments 
system, where the organization was sending $4 billion per month using 
400,000 checks to 2,000 suppliers. Complete implementation of EDI was 
reputed to be capable of saving $200 to $500 in costs per vehicle produced.†
(e) Discount retailer Price Club Canada became one of the more than 4,000 
Canadian companies using EDI to reduce inventories, increase profits, cut 
paper use, and virtually eliminate keying errors. The organization estimates 
that EDI will eventually save an amount equal to about 1 percent of annual 
sales, or almost $12 million (in 1991, revenues were $1.17 billion).‡
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(0  The Canadian government is becoming a big user of EDI. Revenue 
Canada estimates that 80 percent of Canada Customs clients will be using 
EDI by the year 2000, resulting in the saving of 100 million pieces of paper 
a year.‡
(g) In July 1992, Alcoa implemented an EDI program. The company's 
decision to design an electronic payments system was driven by its desire to 
strengthen internal controls in the electronic payment system as well as inte­
grate its payables activities with the efforts of its procurement EDI activity. 
The company's cost analysis revealed savings of more than $300,000 for a 
five-year period.§
* EDI or Die Issues fo r  C anada’s Future, June 1992 (Toronto: Issues for Canada’s 
Future).
†Accounting Reformation, Certified Accountant (July 1992), p. 31. 
 ‡“The Tools of Survival,” EDI or Die Issues fo r  C anada’s Future, February 1993 
(Toronto: Issues for Canada’s Future).
§ National Corporate Cash Management Association, 1993.
Cost Efficiency
While there are some additional costs associated with the implementation 
of EDI, there are also opportunities for cost efficiencies. The additional 
costs include the following:
• Hardware costs associated with the installation (Hardware costs 
vary depending on the type of hardware used— mainframe, mini­
computer, or microcomputer.)
• System development costs that vary according to the extent to 
which EDI is being implemented
• Software costs associated with the installation (The costs of EDI 
software for a minicomputer or mainframe can be significant, 
depending on the complexity of the installation.)
• Initial maintenance of an additional data entry system (one for 
EDI and another for regular transactions)
• Legal and other costs associated with setting up trading partner 
relationships
• Network communication and security costs
• Training
The business benefits, however, are quite substantial. To achieve maxi­
mum benefits under EDI, virtually all data that were exchanged on paper 
should be passed electronically to a client's application system. This can 
produce a number of significant benefits, including lower inventory levels 
(resulting in reduced carrying costs), less waste, improved production
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scheduling, improved cash management, and more effective purchasing 
(shorter ordering cycles to help eliminate shortages). EDI eliminates the 
need for data reentry, reducing overall cost. The levels of cost savings can 
be quite substantial. Cost savings accrue for every transaction that is under­
taken and grow as the business volume increases. It has been estimated 
that EDI can reduce handling costs between $3 and $93 per transaction. 
U.S. auto manufacturers have estimated that they save $200 per car in man­
ufacturing costs because of EDI.2
EDI also allows for cost savings from economies in data entry. Data that 
are keyed at the source can be used at all subsequent processing points 
for a transaction. Rekeying of data by each participating organization is not 
required.
Reduced Paperwork
The reduction in paper not only facilitates faster transmission of business 
information, but results in a number of administrative benefits, including, 
for example —
• Savings from the elimination of forms (mailing costs, form costs, 
and printing costs).
• Personnel reductions, because less paper handling is needed.
• More efficient filing, storage, and retrieval of data.
• Reduced documentation preparation time.
Accuracy and Reduced Errors and Error-C orrection Costs
Data entry errors are normally the most frequently encountered errors in 
an information system. A properly controlled EDI system can significantly 
reduce these errors because information such as that found on price 
quotes, purchase orders, bills of lading, and invoices is passed to and from 
application systems and does not need to be rekeyed. As a result, errors 
and error correction costs are reduced.
Errors are also detected more quickly. In some situations, errors may be 
due not to data entry but to discrepancies in business records (for exam­
ple, the difference between a quoted price and an invoiced price). EDI 
facilitates the detection and resolution of errors at the source.
Better Communications and Customer Service
To achieve the paper reduction needed to provide significant cost savings, 
the relationship between purchaser and supplier will have to be greatly 
transformed. There is a need for more information on both sides. For 
example, the purchaser will have to provide information on forecasted 
future requirements, stock levels, and re-order points; the supplier will
2. See The Role o f  M anagement Accounting in Electronic Data Interchange  (Hamilton, ON: 
Society of Management Accountants of Canada, 1992), pp. 9, 10.
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have to be able to communicate information on issues such as agreed pric­
ing, capacities, and lead requirements.
Beneficial new business practices require accurate, timely, standardized- 
format and controlled data flows between trading partners. Many of these 
new practices, such as just-in-time (JIT) inventory management, are great­
ly facilitated with an integrated EDI system. JIT depends on rapid and 
accurate transmission for ordering and arranging shipping. The time frames 
associated with preparing, handling, and distributing (via mail or courier) 
do not support these beneficial business practices. Postage and paper cost 
reductions are significant benefits associated with EDI.
Remaining Competitive
Two of the overriding characteristics of the modern age are speed and the 
ever-shorter time in which tasks are expected to be accomplished. Easier, 
more efficient, and more readily available transportation and communica­
tion technologies are allowing data, services, products, and people to 
move faster. EDI is a technology whose essence is speed.
The use of EDI lends itself to another rising business requirement of the 
1990s —  customer service. Meeting and exceeding customer expectations 
is a significant ingredient in maintaining a competitive edge. In general, 
competitive position is achieved through a combination of service, quality, 
price, efficiency, accuracy, and timeliness. EDI directly addresses the accu­
racy, timeliness, and efficiency of data movement.
As mentioned in chapter 1, many different applications of EDI are pos­
sible. The maximum benefits of EDI will be achieved when all portions of 
the business cycle are done electronically and the applications are inte­
grated. Although a number of business risks are inherent in EDI, its bene­
fits far outweigh the risks.
WHAT ARE THE EXPOSURES?
When an EDI-based system is used, a number of exposures are present, 
including those discussed in the following paragraphs. Exhibit 3.2 illus­
trates a number of additional potential exposures.
Total Systems Dependence
As an entity’s reliance on EDI, and thus its reliance on computer systems, 
increases, the impact of corrupt applications or undetected errors will be 
magnified. All EDI transactions entered into by an entity could be corrupt­
ed if the EDI-related application became corrupted. If the errors remained 
undetected, there could be an impact on cash flow, noncompliance with 
contractual obligations, and adverse publicity and loss of business confi­
dence by customers and suppliers. Undetected errors in transactions 
received from trading partners could cause losses from inappropriate oper­
ating decisions. In addition, as there is more reliance on computer systems
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and networks, the entity is exposed to disruption of processing and, per­
haps, business operations.
Loss of Confidentiality
Sensitive information may be inadvertently or deliberately disclosed on the 
network or in the mailbox system. Due to the concentration of data, the 
speed of computer systems processing, increased access to data, and the 
transaction flow patterns of data, external parties could accumulate and 
review information about the entity without its knowledge.
Unauthorized Transactions and Fraud
Increased access to computer systems could increase the opportunities to 
change an entity’s computer records and those of its trading partners, 
enabling significant fraud to be perpetrated. Where payment transactions 
are automatically generated by the system, payments could be manipulat­
ed or diverted, or they could be generated in error or at the wrong time. 
The benefit of human experience in identifying unusual or inconsistent 
transactions is reduced with electronic or EDI transactions, which are less 
subject to visual review.
Concentration of Control
The strength of the internal control structure provided by segregation of 
duties and structured management reporting may be reduced or weakened 
in an EDI environment because the number of people is reduced. EDI 
causes management to place a greater reliance on computer systems and 
concentrates control in the hands of fewer individuals, potentially increas­
ing risk. While effective automated controls could reduce the potential for 
human error, the impact of any control deficiencies will be greater and 
could include overpayment, over/understocking, or over/underproduction.
Integrated EDI trading without appropriate monitoring activity may also 
result in the processing of transactions in a manner inconsistent with busi­
ness objectives (for example, ordering from suppliers with which the enti­
ty is in dispute).
Reliance on Third Parties
The entity will become more reliant on third parties to ensure security over 
transactions and continuity of processing. This may create a number of 
potential risks, including —
• Exposure to weak links or unscrupulous employees.
• Disclosure of confidential information.
• Entry of invalid or unauthorized transactions.
• Incomplete or untimely transmission of data.
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Exhibit 3.2
Potential EDI Exposures
Planning & Interface to
M anagement Applications Translation
Improper separation 
of duties
Incompatible standards 
Errors in internal 
systems
Business disruptions 
Improper disclosure of 
information 
Incompatible files
Invalid transactions 
Incomplete transactions 
Missing transactions 
Unauthorized 
transactions 
Untimely transactions 
Incompatible files
Missing/duplicate trans­
actions
Incorrect processes 
Inaccurate processes 
Untimely transactions 
Invalid/unauthorized 
transactions 
Incompatible standards 
Business disruptions
Communications
Unauthorized messages 
Alteration of data 
Misdirected messages 
Lost/altered/duplicated 
messages
Penetration of systems 
by viruses 
Network
availability/integrity
Third-Party VAN
Lost data 
Disclosure of
confidential data 
Corruption of data 
Invalid/ unauthorized 
data
Transmission delays 
Inaccurate VAN charges
Security
Unauthorized 
transactions 
Alteration of valid 
transactions 
Access to confidential 
information 
Unauthorized changes 
to data
Unauthorized changes 
to applications
Data Processing, Application, and Communications Errors
Errors in computer processing and communications systems may result in 
the transmission of incorrect trading information or the reporting of inac­
curate information to management. If not detected in time, inaccurate or 
incomplete output may result in inappropriate decisions and potential 
business losses. Application errors or failures can also result in significant 
losses to trading partners. This can be more acute if, for example, the EDI 
application is tied into production and inventory control.
Potential Legal Liability
Where liability is not clearly defined in trading partner agreements, legal lia­
bility may arise due to errors outside the client’s control. Alternatively, legal 
liability to trading partners may result from errors made by client employees 
or from errors within the client’s computer system. For example, if an order 
is received, acted upon, and subsequently determined to be invalid and the 
trading partner denies sending the order, who bears the cost of having the 
order filled? There can also be contracted penalties for nonperformance.
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Potential Loss of Management and Audit Trails
This is addressed in chapter 5. There will be less paper available for veri­
fying and reconciling transactions. There is also a concern that, without 
proper controls, data could be lost. Policies for retention of data are also 
an issue. Normally, EDI transaction data are not maintained for a long 
period of time. Without proper consideration of legal and audit issues, the 
entity may not be able to provide adequate or appropriate evidence, in 
hard copy or on magnetic media, for the legal dispute to be resolved favor­
ably or the audit to be completed cost-effectively.
Reliance on Trading Partner’s System
In facilitating just-in-time and quick response systems, EDI creates a 
dependence on the trading partner’s computer system. Errors, security 
breaches, and processing disruptions in the trading partner’s system may 
have an impact on the client’s business operations.
Electronic Evidence and Other Legal Issues
Much effort is being made to define the legal requirements for EDI and to 
address various questions, such as the following, that are being raised in 
changing to an electronic system:
• Are the existing legal requirements of writing and signatures sat­
isfied?
• Are electronically transmitted documents legally acceptable and 
who is responsible if something goes wrong?
• Can electronic data be used in a court of law?
A number of publications are available to the auditor that deal with legal 
issues and EDI.3
In light of the significant impact of EDI, it is important that a comprehen­
sive understanding of the relationship be documented in the trading partner 
agreement. As an aid, the auditor can refer to model agreements issued by 
the American Bar Association and the EDI Council of Canada. An outline 
model of a sample trading partner agreement is shown in exhibit 3.3 .
A number of opinions expressed in Canada4 and the United States5 pro­
vide guidance on situations in which computer-produced records can be 
admissible as evidence.
3. These include B. Wright, JD, Legal Issues Impacting EDI (Alexandria, VA: Electronic Data 
Interchange Association, 1989); B. Wright, JD, EDI a n d  American Law (Alexandria, VA: 
Electronic Data Interchange Association, 1989); chapter 7 of EDI For Auditors a n d  
Managers (Toronto: CICA, 1993).
4. See, for example, M anaging a n d  Using Microcomputers (Toronto: CICA, 199D, p. 45, and 
K.D. Chase, “The Current Legal Environment,” Image Processing (Coopers & Lybrand 
Consulting Group, November 1991), pp. 2-4.
5. These include B. Wright, JD, Legal Issues Impacting EDI (Alexandria, VA: Electronic Data 
Interchange Association, 1989), and B. Wright, JD, EDI a n d  American Law (Alexandria, VA: 
Electronic Data Interchange Association, 1989)-
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The following represents an outline model of the various clauses expected 
to be included in a typical TPA agreement. Generally, a TPA would cover 
these core clauses. It remains a matter of tailoring according to the specific 
local governing laws and adding whatever other clauses the contracting par­
ties, assisted by legal counsel, would choose to include. This is the case for 
the American Bar Association (ABA) TPA model, the EDI Council of Canada 
TPA model, prepared by the Legal and Audit Committee, the Australian 
model, and various European models.
Outline
1. Identification of EDI standards
2. Identification of third-party service providers
3. Obligation to conduct EDI competently
4. Adoption of signatures
5. Place and time of message receipt
6. Functional acknowledgments
7. Application acknowledgments
8. Garbled transmissions
9. Trade terms and conditions
10. Disclaimer of confidentiality
11. Legal enforceability of transactions
12. Termination of agreement
13. Disclaimer of obligation to enter into transactions
14. Limitation of liability
15. Arbitration
• The American Bar Association Model EDI TPA can be purchased from the 
ABA by calling (312) 988-5555 and requesting document number: 507- 
0233-B9. Or simply write to:
American Bar Association
Order Fulfillment Department 
750 North Lake Shore Drive 
Chicago, IL 60611
• For the Canadian model TPA, you may contact the EDI Council of Canada. 
The document is called Electronic Data Interchange Trading Partner 
Agreement an d  Commentary. This document contains explanations of 
the various clauses with appropriate expert commentaries from the com­
mittee. Phone (416) 621-7160, FAX: (4l6) 620-9175. Or write to:
EDI Council of Canada
5401 Eglinton West, Suite 203 
Etobicoke, Ontario 
M9C 5K6
Source: EDI For Managers a n d  Auditors, 2d ed. (Toronto: CICA), pp. 120, 121.
C hapter
Audit Planning Issues
This chapter addresses general a n d  p lanning issues fo r  auditing an  entity 
that has an  integrated EDI system.
GENERAL
This chapter deals with general and planning issues for auditing an entity 
that uses EDI. Chapter 5 addresses, in general, the controls that may be 
found in an EDI installation and the related audit implications. Chapter 6 
provides a discussion of possible computer-based techniques that could be 
used when auditing an EDI system.
Audit Benefits
EDI is one of the enabling technologies that change the ways entities do 
business and, consequently, the way auditors may need to audit in these 
environments. Consequently, auditors may have to be more innovative in 
their audit approach.
Some of the audit benefits that should exist in an EDI environment 
include —
• A compressed business cycle, which reduces year-end account 
balances for receivables, payables, and inventories.
• Greater thoroughness of transaction data because of the stan­
dardized controls built into the technology.
• Improved accuracy of transaction data because of the standard­
ization of data formats and the absence of rekeying.
• Better internal and computer controls because of the consistency 
of computer processing and, especially in smaller organizations, 
the formalization of processing procedures and controls.
• Smaller likelihood of material error in financial statement asser­
tions because of the controls in place at the client, VAN, and trad­
ing partners, and because of the increased velocity and decreased 
unit value of transactions that are entered into.
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EDI provides the potential for innovative testing techniques, including —
• Computer-based data file analysis and testing of both control and 
financial statement audit objectives.
• Integrated test facilities.
• Embedded audit modules.
• Concurrent audit tools.
• Electronic confirmation —  possible, but limited, application.
These and other techniques are discussed in more depth in chapter 6.
As EDI becomes more widespread, a substantive audit approach may 
give way to a control risk-oriented methodology with a heavy emphasis on 
tests of controls, taking advantage of computer-based audit techniques, 
where cost effective. This is discussed in the sections that follow.
PLANNING ISSUES
Differences Between EDI and Traditional 
Computerized Environm ents
The auditor needs to be aware of the differences between an entity that uses 
EDI and a traditional computerized environment. These include the following:
• The traditional computerized audit environment has boundaries 
between the audit client and other parties to the transactions. As 
a result of the boundaries, documents are produced as evidence 
of the transaction. In an EDI environment, transactions flow seam­
lessly from one party to another, with little or no physical evi­
dence that the transaction has occurred.
• In an EDI environment, data security and controls need to include 
the protection of information that has physically left the entity and 
is en route to other trading partners. The information that is being 
sent must be protected against alteration, physical mishaps, sabo­
tage, and theft.
• To evaluate EDI evidence that exists only in an electronic form 
may require the auditor to use data extraction tools that were not 
essential in a traditional computerized audit environment.
• In an EDI environment, authorization, completeness, and accura­
cy of transactions may not be as evident as in a more traditional 
environment. They may be expressed in the trading partner 
agreement and in program logic, and perhaps evidenced in cryp­
tic digital authentication codes. To assess these application con­
trol objectives, the auditor is likely to need knowledge of the 
agreements and of system processes.
• In an EDI environment, the use of third-party service providers 
(such as VANs) is prevalent. They present separate audit consid­
erations.
AUDIT PLANNING ISSUES 27
Knowledge of the Business Issues
Obtaining knowledge of the client’s business assists the auditor in a num­
ber of areas, including —
• Identifying the nature and source of the audit evidence available.
• Identifying areas that may require special consideration.
• Evaluating the sufficiency and appropriateness of the audit evi­
dence obtained.
This is very important when dealing with a client who is involved with 
EDI. The use of EDI and the resulting impact on client business practices, 
including those affecting financial reporting, can vary significantly among 
entities. In many cases, the entity is simply receiving purchase orders in a 
different form. Clerical control procedures may still operate effectively, and 
there may be no audit impact. In other cases, however, the implementa­
tion of EDI may be part of a major reengineering of business processes.
For example, a manufacturer does not issue purchase orders; rather, it 
establishes standing contracts with approved suppliers and sends them 
production schedules and bills of materials. The suppliers ship the pre­
arranged parts and materials to meet the production schedules. They do 
not invoice the manufacturer, but instead are paid based on shipping and 
receiving information. The manufacturer regularly audits the performance 
of suppliers against the agreements.
Another example is the retailer that provides daily sales information 
from each of its stores to its suppliers, which do business with the retailer 
under prearranged contracts. They are responsible for maintaining agreed- 
upon stock levels in each store. Again, no purchase orders or invoices exist 
on paper or electronically. Payments are made based on shipping advices, 
and the retailer regularly audits performance.
In each of these examples, the company has changed how it does busi­
ness in ways that affect the transaction streams that ultimately are reflect­
ed in financial statements, and it has changed how it controls purchasing 
and disbursements. The audit team needs to consider these changes when 
assessing risk and designing the audit plan. As might be the case with any 
information technology the client uses, EDI is a necessary enabling tech­
nology that the audit team may need to address, but EDI alone is not the 
determining factor. Any new audit guidance should focus on the need to 
understand the client’s business processes —  and then the technologies 
that support them.
When a client has introduced EDI in all or part of its operation, a number 
of issues will have a bearing on the auditor’s consideration of the internal 
control structure and the nature, timing, and extent of testing. One important 
complication is that the traditional paper trail diminishes or, in fact, vanishes. 
This removes one of the auditor’s significant sources of audit evidence when 
testing controls or substantiating a transaction or account balance.
Another pervasive, and potentially more difficult, impact will be the 
auditor’s response to the new forms of business relationships and the pro­
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found effect on accounting systems and controls. EDI can concentrate a 
large number of transactions with a few customers/suppliers. Also, the 
review of documents, a traditional internal control, disappears. While all 
automated systems have the ability to run automated controls, it is man­
agement’s responsibility to design, implement, and test these controls. The 
auditor needs to keep in mind that the controls are implemented in the 
application systems that are using EDI and not in the EDI itself.1
In essence, the operational and business impact of EDI is that the client 
will increase the general and application controls (this is discussed in detail 
in chapter 5). As the structure of the EDI transaction process laid out in 
exhibit 2.1 illustrates, the transactions are continually subject to implied 
confirmation and are continually analyzed for correctness. The auditor 
often may find it efficient to perform tests of these control procedures as 
a basis for assessing control risk below maximum and thereby reduce the 
extent of substantive testing.
Audit Risk
The three components of audit risk are —
• Inherent risk —  the susceptibility o f an account balance or class 
o f transactions to misstatements that could be material, when 
aggregated with misstatements in other balances or classes, 
regardless of the existence o f internal control.
• Control risk —  the risk that misstatements that could occur in an 
account balance or class of transactions and that could be mater­
ial, when aggregated with misstatements in other balances or 
classes, will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis by 
internal controls.
• Detection risk —  the risk that the audit procedures will not detect 
misstatements that exist in an account balance or class of trans­
actions and that could be material, when aggregated with mis­
statements in other balances or classes.
Each of the components of audit risk is affected by EDI.
Im p a c t on  In h eren t a n d  C on tro l R isk
EDI may significantly affect financial statement assertions because o f its 
impact on the nature of the transactions entered into an entity’s account­
ing system, including the initiation o f transactions. EDI can affect inherent 
and control risk as a result of —
• The increased closeness of partnership relations and integration.
• The compression of the business cycle. As a result, the balance 
sheet may be drastically changed to the point that inventory,
1. See “Audit Implications of EDI,” AICPA InfoTech Update (N Y:AICPA, Fall 1992).
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accounts receivable, and accounts payable are significantly 
reduced.
• The increased velocity of smaller transactions being entered into 
by the entity.
EDI implementation often results in new operational computer systems 
that produce accounting information as a by-product, for example, just-in- 
time inventory control systems. In the past, these operational systems were 
manual or, if they were automated, they were on an independent computer 
system. Management could reconcile output from operational and account­
ing systems or compare them for reasonableness. EDI often brings these 
systems together. The ability for independent reconciliation between trad­
ing partners or VANs, company EDI applications, and internal business 
applications can be embedded in automated routines. This could reduce 
control risk.
Conversely, management’s dependence on computer-based systems 
may increase control risk. Because of the complexity of integrated EDI sys­
tems, it can be more difficult to implement management detective control 
methods that use external data or evidence.
Consider, for example, companies in the retailing industry that send 
inventory status and sales information by location to their suppliers. Based 
on this information and the planned inventory levels predefined by the 
retailer, the vendor ships the necessary quantities to replenish the retailer’s 
shelves. On receipt of the goods, the retailer pays based either on the elec­
tronic shipping notice, usually sent when the vendor’s truck leaves the 
loading dock, or on confirmation from the stores that the goods have been 
received. These electronic messages, substituting for an invoice, are valued 
and extended by the retailer, not the vendor. Price, shipping cost, data, and 
other terms are defined in the trading partner agreements and built into 
both their computer applications.
In this example, it would be difficult for management to create effective 
detective controls external to the EDI computer applications. Control over 
receipt of the goods may have to be accomplished by automatically rec­
onciling actual receipt with “anticipated” receipts generated by the opera­
tional systems of the retailer or the vendor. Also, the extinct purchase order 
and invoice used to be important trigger points for initiating the recording 
of financial activity and externally designed control points. EDI causes the 
control points to occur earlier. It should also be noted that EDI does not 
eliminate the need to validate receipts before payment.
Another result of EDI is that routine reporting periods between trading 
partners based on an accounting period cycle are eliminated. For example, 
a monthly vendor statement may not be provided. Reconciliations are 
more apt to be performed by product line, season, or some other opera­
tional factor, thus removing the ability for an externally generated control 
process based on the end of an accounting cycle, such as a monthly 
accounts receivable statement. As a result, potential adjustments may not 
be identified in the same accounting period.
Also, the EDI trading partner agreement could change business practices
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by creating different payment terms to motivate vendors to provide prod­
ucts to customers within very strict time limits. An example is pay on pro­
duction, where the purchaser pays for goods only after they are used in 
production, instead of on receipt. This has an extensive impact on the fol­
lowing business processes for the customer and the vendor:
• It changes the payment terms and, occasionally, the control point 
for determining when a liability exists. Receiving information may 
be replaced with production information as the control point for 
recording a liability.
• The issue of when title has passed should be detailed in the trad­
ing partner agreement. This should also address which entity has 
risk of loss in relation to title passage.
• It causes a loss of the traditional paper audit trail. This occurs 
because the liability is now being recorded as each individual 
item is used (rather than when an invoice is received). The cus­
tomer’s accounting system is now completely dependent on the 
operational system tracking the use of goods already received.
• The vendor also depends on the customer’s operational and 
accounting systems to provide information to record a sale. If 
these transactions are material to the vendor, the vendor’s audi­
tors may need to consider whether the customer’s applications 
are essentially part of the vendor’s applications and whether addi­
tional audit procedures may be necessary.
All of these can have an impact on inherent and control risk.
I m p a c t on  D e tec tio n  R isk
The potential complexity of EDI systems can increase detection risk (issues 
that significantly impact detection risk were discussed in the section 
“Differences Between EDI and Traditional Computerized Environments”). 
This can be mitigated if the auditor is able to assess control risk at below 
maximum and thus to accept this higher level of detection risk without 
allowing it to increase overall audit risk. The auditor may therefore need 
to become familiar with computer-based controls and computer-based 
audit techniques. Discussions of possible techniques and controls are set 
out in chapter 6 and appendix C.
The Use of VANs and Other Third-Party Service Providers
Chapter 2 discussed the use of third-party service providers for EDI. In 
these situations, the trading partners rely on the third party to route the EDI 
transactions and, in many cases, to provide translation, storage, and other 
processing. It is important that the provider have sufficient computer con­
trols and procedures in place to ensure that the transactions are commu­
nicated and processed correctly and are not inappropriately disclosed.
Professional standards in Canada require the auditor, when planning the 
audit of an enterprise that uses a third-party service organization, to deter­
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mine the nature and extent of the services provided by the service organi­
zation to the enterprise and the sufficiency and appropriateness of audit 
evidence available at the enterprise.2
Professional standards in this area are more detailed in the United States. 
When planning the audit of an enterprise that uses a service organization, 
the auditor should consider factors such as —
• The significance of the financial statement assertions affected by 
the policies and procedures of the service organization.
• The inherent risk associated with the assertions affected by the 
policies and procedures of the service organization.
• The nature of the services provided and whether they are highly 
standardized and used extensively by many user organizations or 
unique and used only by a few.
• The extent to which the user organization’s internal control struc­
ture policies and procedures interact with the policies and proce­
dures of the service organization.
• The user organization’s internal control structure policies and pro­
cedures that are applied to the transactions affected by the service 
organization’s activities.
• The terms of the contract between the user organization and the 
service organization.
• The service organization’s capabilities.
• The user auditor’s prior experience with the service organization.
• The extent of auditable data in the user organization’s possession.
• The existence of specific regulatory requirements that may dictate 
the application of audit procedures beyond those required to 
comply with generally accepted auditing standards.3
When the auditor decides that audit evidence is needed from the third 
party, evidence will have to be obtained either directly or in the form of a 
third-party report. When a third-party report is to be used, as is normally the 
case, its reliability will have to be assessed. The auditor should consider —
• In Canada, the professional qualifications, competence, and 
integrity of the service auditor.
• In the United States, the service auditor’s professional reputation.
These considerations are more fully described in the CICA Handbook, 
Section 5310, “Audit Evidence Considerations When an Enterprise Uses a 
Service Organization,” and in the AICPA’s SAS No. 70, Processing o f  
Transactions by Service Organizations, as well as in other publications.
2. CICA Handbook  (Toronto: CICA), para. 5310.05. Additional nonauthoritative information is 
provided in an audit technique study prepared by R.J. Widdowson, CA, Auditor Reports on 
Control Procedures a t Service Organizations (Toronto: CICA, 1990).
3. See Processing o f  Transactions by Service Organizations, Statement on Auditing Standards 
No. 70 (New York: AICPA, April 1992).
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The auditor may also consider other available sources that corroborate 
the evidence obtained from the service auditor. These would include —
• Statements by VAN management describing its responsibilities in 
maintaining controls and the mechanisms in place to support the 
control structure.
• Reports issued by internal auditors that address the controls.
• Any other special reports by the external auditors that corroborate 
the effective functioning of the control procedures.
Use of Public Networks
As mentioned earlier in this study, there is increasing use of public net­
works, such as CompuServe, Prodigy, and the Internet, to transmit or trans­
port documents and transactions. The auditor should be aware of the fol­
lowing when assessing audit risk:
• Inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information to unauthorized 
parties
• Computer or transmission disruption
• Hackers and viruses
• Attempted electronic frauds
It is difficult to assess control risk in these networks because they are 
public and their primary focus is not EDI services.
AUDITOR INVOLVEMENT IN NEW SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 
Prelim inary Review
Because of the significant benefits and changes in relationships that can 
accompany EDI, the auditor may want to consider involvement in the 
development of a new EDI system and may want to consider obtaining an 
understanding of the impact of EDI on the client. The auditor may want to 
determine whether the proposed EDI system will work as expected and 
whether the system has appropriate internal controls. This will help the 
auditor in obtaining knowledge of the client’s business and, later, in assess­
ing control risk. Also, when substantive testing is intended, the auditor 
should ascertain that computer-assisted audit techniques (CAATs) or other 
procedures can be developed in time and that access to appropriate data 
is possible. Such involvement would also allow the auditor to have embed­
ded audit modules designed during the development phase (see chapter 6 
for a discussion of embedded audit modules).
When reviewing the proposed controls, the auditor should review the 
general management and application controls to ensure that adequate con­
trols are planned. For example, these might include controls to identify and 
highlight authorized transactions or duplicate or missing transactions aris­
ing from input or application errors, recovery-restart errors, or deliberate
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disruption. This could be done in coordination with the internal auditors 
of the organization. An adequate contingency program should also be 
developed during the system development. As discussed in chapter 5, it is 
important that controls be preventive rather than detective in nature.
Hard copy, data, and document management procedures and audit trails 
should be adequate for settling disputes, reconciling transactions, recon­
ciling charges, establishing accountability, and conducting the audit. Fre­
quency of archiving and data retention should be considered.
AUDIT APPROACH
Substantive Approach Versus Tests of Controls
Because of the impact of EDI on the client’s business, a substantive audit 
approach may no longer be cost-effective. It should be noted that effective 
application and general controls are important for effective EDI transaction 
processing. As a result, there should be a number of effective internal con­
trols and the auditor should be able to assess control risk at below maxi­
mum.
To assess control risk at below maximum, the auditor will need to be 
able to perform tests of controls. This involves knowledge of the controls 
that should be present (addressed in general in chapter 5 and in appendix 
C) and knowledge of the audit techniques that might be followed. 
Appendix C also sets out a general audit program that might be considered 
when performing tests of controls and conducting substantive tests in an 
EDI environment.
Relating Controls to Financial Statement Assertions
For an audit to be effective and efficient, the auditor should ensure that the 
computer controls are properly related to the appropriate financial state­
ment assertion. This is discussed in depth in chapter 5 following the dis­
cussion of EDI specific controls.
C hapter
EDI Controls and Audit 
Implications
This chapter addresses, in general, computer controls that should exist in 
an  EDI system an d  their related audit implications.
INTRODUCTION
Control objectives for EDI systems are essentially the same as those for any 
information system. The nature of some risks and the potential impact of 
a control failure, however, may differ. These will affect the types of con­
trols the auditor should expect to find.
For example, because of the velocity of transactions and the reduced 
opportunity for clerical and supervisory monitoring, most controls will 
need to be automated. Detective, “after the fact” controls will be less effec­
tive, and preventive controls will grow in importance. Appropriate EDI 
standards and electronic acknowledgments are examples of controls that 
can prevent unauthorized, incomplete, and inaccurate transactions from 
being processed.
An additional impact of EDI is the absence of paper documents and, 
thus, of an important traditional body of audit and legal evidence of com­
mitments and transfers of rights and obligations. Innovative uses of encryp­
tion techniques are evolving to fill this void.
This chapter will discuss these and other control mechanisms that sup­
port authentication in an EDI environment. It will then briefly discuss some 
EDI-specific aspects of general information technology controls and appli­
cation controls, and suggest how EDI application controls support the 
financial statement assertions. A more extensive list of relevant controls is 
set out in appendix C.
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EDI-SPECIFIC ISSUES
Electronic Signatures and Communications1
L ack  o f  L eg a l P re c e d e n t
There will not be a definitive answer as to whether EDI messages are capa­
ble of creating legally binding contractual obligations until a challenge or 
ruling is made in a court of law.
U.S. P e r s p e c tiv e
There is some question as to whether or not EDI transactions are enforce­
able in court as contracts. This relates to the “statute of frauds,” which gen­
erally requires that some contracts be supported by written and signed 
evidence to be enforceable. There seems to be a growing belief, however, 
that a well-drafted trading partner agreement can overcome this hurdle. 
Also, there is a strong argument in favor of the statute of frauds, as it is 
now drafted, considering recorded EDI contracts to be enforceable, even 
if the parties have no formal agreement.
Another issue is when messages should be deemed to have a legal 
effect. This is important when companies fix a daily deadline after which 
messages will be either rejected outright or processed at a premium cost.
Under the American Bar Association (ABA) model, messages are not 
effective until they have reached a certain computer designated by the 
recipient. The ABA model contemplates the use of functional acknowl­
edgments to confirm all messages. Those drafting the model agreement 
believed that this was prudent, given the low cost of such acknowledg­
ments. This could be valid for many, but not all, EDI implementations. 
Some entities will not use functional acknowledgments, but instead rely on 
other means of ensuring successful communications, such as mutual trad­
ing partner obligations in the trading partner agreement, and institute the 
controls needed to ensure secure conduct of EDI.
C a n a d ia n  P e r s p e c tiv e
In Canada, too, EDI poses a legal challenge. Certain contracts must be 
made in writing and signed by the parties to the contract. Rules of contract 
formation, including document delivery, have been developed that deter­
mine if a contract exists and when it came into existence. In some juris­
dictions, such as Ontario, a contract for the sale of goods worth $40 or 
more is not enforceable unless a written note or memorandum of the con­
tract has been made. The important issue is whether EDI can be used to 
create enforceable contracts when such written evidence is required.
The issue of electronic signatures usually presents less of a problem in 
Canada than in the United States because it is normally not dealt with by
1. This section was developed from material contained in pages 95-96 and 108-110 of EDI 
fo r  Managers a n d  Auditors, 2d ed. (Toronto: CICA, 1993). The U.S. perspective was pro­
vided by Benjamin Wright, attorney and counselor, Dallas, Texas. The Canadian perspec­
tive was provided by George S. Takach, partner, McCarthy Tetrault, Toronto, Ontario.
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statute. As a result, contract validity can be determined more flexibly in a 
court of law.
The section “Nonrepudiation and Authentication Controls” discusses the 
issue of nonrepudiation. If nonrepudiation control is established, the 
receiver of a message can prove to a third party that a message was from 
a particular sender.
Nonrepudiation and Authentication Controls
The term nonrepudiation refers to the use of authentication techniques, 
message acknowledgments, and effective audit trails to decrease the risk 
of a party’s repudiating an EDI transaction. The stronger the authentication 
techniques, acknowledgments, and audit trails that are in place, the less 
likely it is that a transaction will be repudiated. Discussed below are 
authentication techniques, acknowledgments, and audit trails that can be 
used to support the objective of nonrepudiation.
In the EDI environment, nonrepudiation can be established at each 
point in the EDI process where information is exchanged:
• Nonrepudiation o f origin —  This technique allows the sender of 
a message to provide the receiver with irrevocable proof of the 
origin of the message. It will protect against any attempt by the 
sender later on to deny sending the message. This control is pro­
vided on a per-message basis using encryption.
• Nonrepudiation o f  submission —  This technique allows the 
sender of a message to obtain irrevocable proof that a message 
was submitted to the VAN for delivery to the specified receiver. 
This proof will protect the sender against any attempt by the VAN 
to claim that the message was not submitted. This control is also 
provided on a per-message basis using encryption.
• Nonrepudiation o f delivery —  This technique allows the sender of 
a message to obtain from the receiver irrevocable proof that the 
message was delivered. This control will protect the sender 
against any attempt by the receiver to subsequently deny receiv­
ing the message. Control of this type is also provided on a per- 
message basis using encryption.
Sender, R ec ip ien t, a n d  M e ssa g e  A u th en tica tio n  a n d  E n cryp tio n
Authenticating the sender and/or recipient using encrypted unique codes 
or an electronic signature provides evidence of authorship/ownership of 
the EDI transaction. The recipient can verify the sender or the originator 
(entity or individual) of the EDI transaction. The sender can verify that the 
intended recipient received the EDI transaction.
Message authentication helps ensure that the EDI transaction set was 
not modified during transmission. An example of message authentication 
is the verification of encrypted hash total. Message authentication and 
encryption as control techniques are discussed below.
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A ck n o w led g m en ts
The use of positive/negative acknowledgments also supports the objective 
of nonrepudiation. The use of acknowledgments should be defined in the 
trading partner agreements (TPAs). There are several kinds of acknowl­
edgments, and it is important for the auditor to understand the significance 
of each as it pertains to nonrepudiation.
Types of acknowledgments include —
• Sender to VANs.
• VANs to sender/recipient.
• Recipient to VANs.
• Recipient to sender.
Acknowledgments can include —
• Time.
• Number of bytes.
• Status of transactions.
• Downloaded to recipient mailbox.
• Acknowledged receipt from recipient.
A u d it T ra ils
To support nonrepudiation, sufficient electronic audit trails need to be 
maintained. The audit trail supports the determination of whether a ques­
tioned transaction was correctly processed or received by an authorized 
party. Effective audit trails need to include activity logs, including 
processed and failed transactions, network and sender/recipient acknowl­
edgments, and time sequence of processing.
Message Authentication and Encryption  
G en era l
The disappearance of paper and the related traditional paper audit trail, the 
high volume of transactions, and the elimination of human intervention in 
transaction processing generally require that proper security and control 
measures exist, depending on the nature of the transactions and transmis­
sion. It is appropriate that the client conduct a risk analysis for the poten­
tial contingent losses associated with the messages to be transmitted by the 
proposed EDI system. Such an analysis should consider whether message 
contents could be disclosed to unauthorized persons, whether messages 
could be accepted from dubious sources, or whether messages could be 
changed during transmission.
When the authenticity of the originator or the integrity of the message 
must be ensured, the client should consider using a message authentica­
tion code (MAC). Alternatively, when message confidentiality is the prima­
ry concern, encryption should be considered as a means of control. With 
either technique, managing the automated or manual key exchange 
between trading partners is of prime importance.
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In early 1989, the ANSI X 12 committee developed two technical stan­
dards for security:
1. The X12.58 security structures
2. The X 12.42 cryptographic service message (CSM) transaction set
ANSI X 12.58 defines data formats for security structures consisting of 
message authentication and encryption. ANSI X12.42 provides rules for the 
exchange of keying materials in an X 12 environment. Where it is impor­
tant to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of data to be transmitted, 
these message authentication and encryption standards should be consid­
ered in EDI technical systems specifications. ANSI supports the use of 
authentication and encryption independently or in combination. When 
both techniques are used, authentication should precede encryption for 
reasons of expediency.
M e ssa g e  A u th en tica tio n
A  MAC is a cryptographic check-sum value calculated by passing the entire 
message or authentication elements for the message through a cipher sys­
tem. The sender attaches the MAC to the message before sending it. The 
receiver recalculates the MAC upon receipt and compares it with the sent 
MAC. If the two MACs are not equal, this means that the message has been 
altered in some way during transmission, and the sender and receiver are 
alerted of the failure of the MAC code to authenticate the message.
Authentication can also be used to detect attempts to delete, duplicate, 
or insert messages. This can be accomplished by introducing unique iden­
tifiers, sequence numbers, or date/time stamps into each EDI transaction.
E n cryp tio n
If authentication is used, messages can still be in plain text form and read­
able by anyone able to access them. To make messages totally unreadable 
by unauthorized persons, encryption must be used. Encryption is the con­
version of plain text data into cipher text data by using a cryptographic algo­
rithm and key. Data are cryptographically disguised in such a way that only 
the parties with the key can view them in their native form. Encryption pro­
tects the privacy of data passing between a sender and a receiver, irrespec­
tive of any communication nodes traversed by the message, as only the 
sender and the receiver are aware of the cryptographic key. The message 
source and destination identifiers must exist in plain text form, however, so 
that each node in the network knows how to route the message.
Although the cryptographic algorithm can vary, the two most common 
types are DES (Data Encryption Standard) and RSA (Rivest, Shamir and 
Adleman algorithm). DES uses a system of identical pairs of private keys. 
The authorizer uses a private key to affix the encrypted authorization to a 
transaction. This is then authenticated by another person who has the iden­
tical private key. This can be cumbersome in large organizations because 
identical pairs of private keys are required by each authorizer/authentica- 
tor. DES is, however, the most commonly used standard.
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RSA uses a system of public and private keys. For every private key, a 
public key is published on a specified database. Authorizations are affixed 
to transactions using the private key. Anyone having access to the speci­
fied database can then authenticate using the public key. It should be 
noted that it is not possible to determine a person’s private key from that 
person’s public key.
Cyptographic security can be applied to different levels of an X 12 trans­
action. For instance, it can be used at the transaction level to encrypt pay­
ment orders, at a functional group level to encrypt batches of payment 
orders and purchases in one envelope, or at both levels at the same time. 
Transaction set-level security is commonly used, since problems encoun­
tered at that level will not cause the entire functional group to be rejected.
H a r d w a r e  E n cryp tio n
Hardware security modules (HSMs) are self-contained, physically secure, 
special-purpose computers that perform security-related processes and that 
securely store security parameters and/or other sensitive data. They are 
also used to install cryptographic keys without disclosure to operators. En­
cryption performed by tamper-proof, physically secure hardware devices 
is far more secure than encryption performed by software. Typically, any 
unauthorized attempt to access an HSM results in its erasing all sensitive 
security-related data.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (GENERAL) CONTROLS 
Security
Proper access controls assist in preventing or detecting deliberate or acci­
dental errors caused by improper use or manipulation of data files or by 
unauthorized or incorrect use of computer programs or resources. EDI 
does not really change the nature of the access controls needed, but it 
increases the importance of having a comprehensive controls system 
backed by strong policies. For example, uncontrolled access to EDI sys­
tems could expose an entity to unintended commitments to its customers 
and vendors that could not be easily voided.
As in any information systems environment that has an impact on audit­
ing, the auditor may want to test control features that deny unauthorized 
personnel the ability to authorize or initiate a transaction or to change infor­
mation already in the system. In a growing number of cases, trading part­
ners have access to each other’s systems, for example, to obtain information 
on stock levels, production schedules, and other data. Access controls for 
third parties, such as trading partners, will take on increased importance.
For example, to ensure that all transactions are authorized, VANs can 
validate trading partner IDs and passwords and, in some cases, reject trans­
actions that have not been specifically authorized by sets of trading part­
ners. Validation can also be done by translation software or by the client’s 
access control and application software.
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Example 1 -  A representative of company ABC accesses the VAN, logging 
in with company (and perhaps personal) ID and password. (For interactive 
applications, this may be done once a day or may be a dedicated connec­
tion.) The representative then uploads (transmits) transaction strings, each 
with an envelope (appropriate header and trailer records) that specifies a 
supplier’s network address code and contains customer address (and/or 
other identifying code) and authenticating password, if needed.
The VAN computer looks at the envelope header and files the transac­
tion string in the mailbox of the addressee. If addressee code is not in the 
table of VAN subscribers, the VAN will reject the transaction string.
A representative of company XYZ accesses the mailbox, logging in with 
company (and perhaps personal) ID and password. The representative then 
downloads the transaction string from the mailbox. For each string, the rep­
resentative checks the envelope:
• Is address correct (to XYZ’s address)?
• Is sender address a valid code in the table of approved partner codes?
• If XYZ requires an authentication password, is the password the correct 
one for that partner code?
Program  Changes
Virtually the same controls apply to program changes as to normal appli­
cation systems development, with added consideration for emergency or 
urgent fixes.
Retention, Backup, and Contingency Plans
There should be appropriate retention, backup, and contingency plans in 
place to minimize the impact of disputes or transaction failure. In addition, 
if it becomes necessary to recover data, the recovery should be accom­
plished in an acceptable time period. This can be extremely important to 
entities with significant technology dependence.
Some of the controls that might be considered include the following:
File retention
• Ensure that EDI transaction files are retained for a sufficient peri­
od of time and in an appropriate format to satisfy audit, taxation, 
and business requirements.
• Ensure that they are retained for enough time to allow for settle­
ment of questions, errors, and disputes relating to EDI transac­
tions.
Backup a n d  forw ard recovery
• The roles and responsibilities for recovery should be set out be­
tween the trading partners.
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• Alternative ways to transfer EDI information should be examined.
• Contingency plans should be developed by each trading partner, 
and the trading partner agreement should specify required testing 
of the plans.
• Off-site compatible equipment should be used as backup.
• Backup system software and file retention should be used.
• The forward and store, forward function should be automated.
• Manual or system verification should be used to ensure that all 
transactions have been recovered.
It is important that the auditor be aware of the data retention period to 
ensure that the audit trail is not completely lost and transactions can be 
audited, when needed.
VANs
Consideration needs to be given to the controls of network service 
providers to ascertain that sufficient transaction security and integrity exist. 
Most vendors provide automated controls in areas of recovery, protection 
against data loss, and error checking. Depending on the extent of services 
provided by the VAN, the auditor may want to consider obtaining a third- 
party report when necessary. If the VAN provides primarily a switch/store 
forward service, such a report might not be necessary. If the VAN provides 
significant processing, however, such a report will likely be necessary.
In addition to basic considerations of service level, rights, and obliga­
tions, the VAN should provide information on issues such as the following:
• The customer’s right to data in case of dispute
• Continuing service in case of disaster
• Availability of transaction logs
• Provisions for confidentiality
• Fallback procedures
• Whether a third-party report will be provided
APPLICATION CONTROLS AND RELATIONSHIP TO FINANCIAL 
STATEMENT ASSERTIONS
Application controls may differ depending on whether the transactions are 
inward or outward bound. The auditor may want to obtain an under­
standing o f the entire application and any interrelated applications be­
cause, once transactions are in process, there may be limited opportunity 
for further review and follow-up. Segregation of duties at larger clients 
(especially for input, transaction generation, and authorization) is an 
important consideration, especially for outbound transactions.
Because a transaction can quickly affect business functions, there is a 
need for intervention earlier in the processing cycle to act on potential
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problems, particularly for inbound transactions. As discussed previously, 
preventive controls are needed because detective controls may be applied 
too late. Automated controls are needed to compensate for the reduced 
human intervention in processing. Some of the control requirements for 
inbound and outbound transactions that should be considered are set out 
in appendix C.
Application controls should be present to prevent or detect errors that 
could cause material misstatements in the financial statement assertions. 
These controls can be directly related to the financial statement assertions.
Completeness
In a more traditional computer application, classic “batch total” sequen­
tially numbered document and control procedures would typically be 
designed to meet this control objective. In an EDI environment, however, 
this control needs to be established by the program when the transaction 
is initiated or received. In an EDI environment, application controls can be 
built into any or all of the software application, translation, or communi­
cation levels to ensure that all transactions are complete.
Electronic techniques in the communications layer determine that each 
EDI transaction is transmitted without transmission errors. Most communi­
cation protocols include algorithms for predetermining values for bits. 
These techniques can determine whether any “noise” or loss of signal has 
altered the data in the transmission and automatically request retransmis­
sion. These techniques are very similar to parity checking for information 
written to or read from a computer’s data storage devices (tape or disk). 
The auditor may want to determine if these types of controls were in effect 
for the audit period.
At the translation level, there are various examples of controls that try 
to ensure that all transactions that should be recorded are, in fact, record­
ed. EDI envelopes can have sequential control numbers that can be 
tracked by the translation software. Missing, duplicate, or out-of-sequence 
messages can be identified and investigated by each trading partner. The 
“back of the envelope” or trailer segment can also include a control 
counter and hash total of the messages in the envelope (as calculated by 
the sender). Upon receipt, these control totals can be compared by the 
receiver to the messages received. Discrepancies can then be investigated.
Another way of ensuring completeness at the translation level is through 
the use of functional acknowledgments; an EDI message response is sent 
by the receiver informing the sender that the message was received. It 
acknowledges the receipt of the envelope and notes that the EDI data seg­
ments and transaction set headers and trailers (see chapter 3) are correct­
ly represented. It does not verify receipt of envelope contents. The func­
tional acknowledgment is merely a safeguard that both parties’ EDI soft­
ware will understand the data elements in the transaction and will be able 
to pass them on to the application software.
Application acknowledgments, similar to functional acknowledgments, 
may also be used. These are handled by the business application software
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layer and offer more information, or a greater level of understanding of the 
message. For example, a functional acknowledgment might, in effect, say, 
“We received your envelope, it contained one purchase order.” The appli­
cation acknowledgment could add, “And we can supply the quantity of 
items for the price stated.”
Another way of trying to ensure completeness is by aging any 
unmatched entries in the EDI transaction log files. Those that are not rec­
onciled with matching transaction sets should be investigated after some 
specified period. This specified period could vary by each transaction, 
depending on parameters in the initial transaction. For example, an EDI 
purchase order may contain a specified delivery date. The purchase order 
acknowledgment and other responses from the trading partner should be 
received before that date. The purchase order could have more than one 
date, that is, one date to anticipate the acknowledgment and another for 
the shipping notice and still another for receipt of the invoice.
The auditor may need a good understanding of how the client tracks 
EDI transactions through its software layers and what reconciliation pro­
cedures are performed by the application software, or perhaps by special 
control programs that analyze the EDI transaction log files and other con­
trol files.
Existence/O ccurrence
Message authentication, as discussed in the section “Message Authenti­
cation and Ecryption,” is a procedure that allows each party to verify that 
data received are genuine and have not been altered. It can be used to 
detect situations in which there are discrepancies (accidental or deliberate) 
between the sender’s and the receiver’s translation software. It would not, 
however, assist in detecting whether an error had occurred in the sender’s 
application system.
Again, EDI transaction log files could be used to help provide assurance 
that transactions were recorded in the appropriate accounting period and 
that the accounts reflect existing assets and liabilities at the audit date. 
Before the specifics are discussed, the different levels of acknowledgment 
between the trading partners need to be reviewed.
The functional acknowledgment offers the sender only limited assur­
ance that the transaction sent to the receiver (supplier) was understood per 
the agreed-upon standards. A separate EDI transaction, acknowledging 
acceptance of the contents of the purchase order and any implied com­
mitments, is required before the sender can be satisfied that its needs can 
be met by the supplier.
Valuation
Pricing information for a transaction may come from the EDI purchase 
order or a mutually controlled pricing catalogue maintained by the trading
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partners. The review and authorization for processing changes to these 
periodic price catalogues should also be controlled by the supplier’s access 
and authorization software, and these may need to be addressed by the 
auditor.
In many cases, the purchaser’s trading partners may send priced and 
extended electronic invoices that can be logged into the EDI transaction 
log files and recorded in the general ledger by the application software 
layer. As long as a comparison with the purchase order price is performed, 
the controls ensuring completeness could assist in determining proper val­
uation. Access controls over the price file used when the purchase order 
was created would have to be present.
Depending on the nature of the transaction, standards could be used to 
check the accuracy of any key valuation fields. For example, a control total 
of invoice amounts could be included in the envelope and used by the 
partners to check pricing/cost valuation accuracy.
As the relationship between trading partners evolves, one trend is to 
remove redundant documents, such as the electronic invoice. When this 
occurs, the shipping notice or the receiving information provides the val­
uation. In this case, the auditor may wish to test the access controls and 
authorization to change prices associated with the trading partners’ prod­
ucts to determine whether the accounts are properly valued.
Measurement/Ownership (Rights and Obligations)
A liability does not exist until the goods are shipped or received, depend­
ing on the trading partner agreement and the shipping terms expressed in 
the purchase order. The EDI transaction log file may indicate that a liabil­
ity should be recorded when the file is updated with information entered 
from the entity’s receiving department; or the liability might arise when the 
entity receives an electronic shipping notice from the supplier or an elec­
tronic manifest from a freight company (that is, Free on Board, or FOB, 
shipping point). Therefore, the portfolio of EDI transaction sets required to 
record a liability and the timing of the liability may vary, depending on the 
terms in the EDI transactions.
The auditor may have to determine the different shipping terms used 
and, if the procedures contained in the applications provide for appropri­
ate correlation of dates, to enable recording of transactions on a timely 
basis. Review of the aging of incomplete files or, perhaps, reconciliations 
of complete transaction files and bills of lading could provide some assur­
ance of the timely recording of transactions.
The use of acknowledgments, discussed previously, can also assist in 
ensuring that transactions are recorded on a timely basis. A client applica­
tion or translation system could, for example, identify EDI transmissions 
that remain unmatched for more than a particular amount of time. One 
final control would be to use date-and time-stamping for EDI transactions. 
The VAN and/or trading partners could then investigate unread messages.
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Presentation
Controls to ensure proper classification are similar to those in other 
advanced automated systems. Normally, the auditor would expect to find 
cross-reference tables using an identifier, such as a part number or cus- 
tomer/supplier number, that assigns appropriate classifications for posting 
and/or reporting purposes. Details on the initial electronic purchase order 
could also help in determining the proper classification.
C hapter
Examples of Computer-Assisted 
Audit Techniques
This chapter provides examples o f computer-assisted audit techniques that 
can be used fo r  gathering evidence on a substantive or test-of-control basis.
INTRODUCTION
As mentioned previously, EDI is one of the enabling technologies that 
change the way organizations do business and the way that auditors may 
need to audit these environments. In an integrated EDI environment, paper 
is replaced by streams of electronic data that can be most easily analyzed 
in automated fashion. Also, the use of programmed controls, rather than 
manual controls, is likely to increase, and so will the need for advanced 
automated audit techniques to deal with this environment. The auditor’s 
challenge is how to effectively audit in this paperless, programmed con­
trol-intensive environment.
In the course of gathering audit evidence, the auditor should consider 
the use of computer-assisted audit techniques (CAATs). As discussed in 
chapter 4, the auditor may need to be familiar with computer-based audit 
techniques in order to obtain audit evidence of an EDI transaction. The 
purpose of this chapter is to discuss some of the testing methods available 
for use in an integrated EDI system. These techniques include, for exam­
ple, the use of audit software, integrated test facilities, embedded audit 
modules, and concurrent audit tools. It addresses the possibilities and lim­
itations of some potential methods of testing. It does not, however, address 
all of the procedures that could be used in a traditional computer system.
In addition, because of the dependency of the entity on computer pro­
cessing and the fact that the traditional paper-based audit trail disappears, 
the auditor may want to perform tests of programmed control procedures 
and is thus more likely to use computer-assisted audit techniques. Exam­
ples of procedures are also set out in this chapter.
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COMPUTER-ASSISTED AUDIT TECHNIQUES
Integrated Test Facility 
In tro d u c tio n
An integrated test facility (ITF) is a fictitious entity, such as an imaginary 
company, established on a live data file. It enables the auditor to enter test 
transactions into the system without corrupting the integrity of real opera­
tional or financial data.
An ITF is best used in —
• Testing transactions of automated applications.
• Testing integrated processing where entered or generated data 
automatically update data files used in several applications.
• Testing when the audit trail is complex and the system makes it 
difficult to trace transaction flow.
A u d it A d v a n ta g e s
There are a number of audit advantages to using an ITF in an integrated 
EDI operation:
• It is well suited to testing where a paper audit trail no longer exists.
• It is very suitable to on-line systems.
• It allows for more comprehensive system testing, because trans­
actions are entered into the system in a manner similar to live 
transactions.
• It permits recurring audit checks to be performed with minimal 
operational difficulty.
• Most, if not all, EDI software vendors provide built-in ITF capability.
It is possible for an auditor to launch test transactions through direct 
access or a VAN and simulate a trading partner’s transaction. The purpose 
would be to test controls (for example, trading partner IDs and passwords, 
sequential numbering and reconciliation of transmission edits, message 
authentication codes) that are part of the organizational systems. If the 
entity uses a VAN, the test transactions could be sent to the VAN and 
addressed to the entity. The entity would then authorize the VAN to accept 
transactions from the auditor and forward them to the entity’s mailbox. The 
auditor could launch these test transactions on a continuous or periodic 
basis and compare the expected processing results with the actual results.
Another alternative would be to set up audit transaction types that 
duplicate current transactions and process these back to the auditor. The 
auditor would need to register these with the VAN. It is also possible to set 
up a more advanced integrated testing facility where the auditors of both 
trading partners cooperate in their audits. The integrated facility is set up 
with appropriate backout of live audit transactions as they are processed 
through the trading partners’ systems.
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Example 1 discusses a comprehensive test that verifies the actions taken 
by the VAN when the transmission is received, the translation process, and, 
most important, the actions taken by the application. This technique would 
provide assurance for the functioning of controls, which could be pro­
grammed and/or user-dependent. Because the auditor controls which test 
transactions are used and when, flexibility in the timing of procedures and 
the quality of the audit evidence obtained are high.
Example 1 — One example of an integrated test facility application is in a large 
health insurance organization that electronically receives and pays claims from 
hospitals. Using the auditor account at the VAN, or other access into the orga­
nization’s system, the auditor submits a series of claims (e.g., dental claims, sur­
gical claims, etc.) via EDI and reviews the claims register to determine which 
claims were paid and the amount of payment. The test claims include a vari­
ety of conditions, including claims both for individuals who are entitled to ben­
efits and fictitious individuals. In addition, procedures such as heart surgery 
that are payable by the insurance company, and procedures such as cosmetic 
surgery that are not covered by insurance, as well as charges within and in 
excess of reimbursable limits, are tested. The test data go through the system 
and output is routed to the test division or dummy account. This file is then 
reviewed online by the auditor.1
A u d it D isa d v a n ta g e s
If a client’s systems were designed without ITF capabilities, it is unlikely 
that the entity will redesign them to accommodate the auditors. Still, man­
agement may have no other acceptable alternative. There are a number of 
implementation considerations:
• Test data must be developed or obtained; it can be a significant 
effort to design and build a test deck and generator that have the 
flexibility to deal with various EDI standards that are in place.
• As with any system development effort, the cost of adding ITF 
facilities can be significant if they were not added during the 
development phase.
• The required level of knowledge to work with an EDI translator 
can be quite high, depending on the number of transaction sets 
and standards used.
• Care should be taken by the auditor to ensure either that the test 
transactions are prevented from entering the live data environ­
ment or that they are eliminated after their entry.
1. See C. Zoladz, “Auditing in an Integrated EDI Environment,” IS Audit & Control Journal, 
Vol. II, 1994 (Rolling Meadows, IL: Information Systems and Control Systems, 1994), p. 38.
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• There is a potential for unauthorized application modifications 
that identify audit transactions and process them differently from 
other (real) transactions.
Data Extraction and Analysis (Audit) Software 
In tro d u c tio n
Traditional audit software can be used at both the sender and receiver ends 
to audit and sample the transaction streams from application logs created 
within the application’s program suite or from the EDI interface. Also, 
audit software can be used to extract information from the relevant data 
bases, VAN audit trails, or archive files. Some of the advanced EDI work­
stations from network providers provide audit trails of work carried out by 
users at each workstation. Audit software could be written to extract audit 
information if the precoded audit information retrieval is not sufficient. 
The auditor can also request audit reports from the network provider in 
various sequences by inputting EDI audit transactions that reference the 
audit trail file. These references can then be captured on-line and analyzed 
by audit software (for example, select transmissions sent between 
September 1 and September 30, 19XX, in document receiver sequence). 
The auditor can then use the audit software to sample a document type for 
follow-up or produce a report to analyze a particular receiver.
With the VAN’s permission, audit software could also be used to access 
the archive file and extract audit information on selected transactions. The 
auditor would need to check with the VAN provider to find out how long 
the files are held on-line. Access to earlier transaction information may be 
impossible if the files are not retained, or difficult if the files are stored off­
line or off-site.
A u d it A d v a n ta g e s
Audit software is useful when there is no manual audit trail. For example, 
it can be used to identify outstanding advance shipping notices that remain 
unmatched with shipping invoices. If the client does not have a similar 
reporting mechanism, this test could help identify unrecorded liabilities. 
Finally, it can be helpful in testing the functioning and effectiveness of the 
control itself.
As EDI evolves, it will provide excellent opportunities for this type of 
software, since there are standard transaction documents that will allow for 
portability from one client to another.
A u d it D isa d v a n ta g e s
There are various disadvantages to using data extraction and analysis soft­
ware. In an EDI environment, the lack of data availability may be the most 
prevalent.2
2. A detailed discussion of the benefits and challenges presented by CAATs is provided in 
Application o f  Computer Assisted A udit Techniques Using Microcomputers (Toronto: CICA, 
1994).
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Embedded Audit Modules
In tro d u c tio n
Embedded audit modules are programs written and compiled within an 
application to perform audit procedures concurrent with the operation of 
the application. These modules may run routinely or function only when 
specifically activated.
Embedded audit modules enable continuous monitoring and analysis of 
transaction processing. They are particularly effective in high-volume, on­
line, real-time systems, in which the timeliness, completeness, accuracy, and 
validity of transactions are essential. Such systems do not lend themselves to 
manual auditing. In many situations, embedded audit modules are imple­
mented for the applications that pose the highest risk for the organization.
It is possible to embed these modules in the EDI system at different lev­
els. At the trading partner entry level, for example, it would be possible to 
embed a module at an individual EDI workstation level. It would also be 
possible to embed a module at the communication software level, if all 
messages went along a leased line. These messages could then be written 
to an audit file for later examination.
A u d it A d v a n ta g e s
The use of embedded audit modules offers a number of audit advantages:
• They enable the auditor to continuously monitor systems.
• They allow the auditor to have specific data samples selected at 
any time because the data are selected simultaneously with the 
normal production process.
• They encourage auditor involvement during the system design 
phase.
Compelling reasons for the use of embedded audit modules in an inte­
grated EDI environment are the loss of a visible audit trail and the fact that 
transaction files may not be available for subsequent analysis. In many 
cases, the embedded audit module can be extended with exception report­
ing and file interrogation facilities. This will provide the auditor with an 
effective way to detect unauthorized system modifications.
These modules are complex, advanced audit tools. The auditor can use 
them to select items for review or evaluation (for example, deviations from 
predetermined purchase and sales policies and frequency of certain types 
of transactions).
Embedded audit modules are useful in monitoring the performance of 
the EDI software and the translating system and/or application system on 
a continuous or selective basis. Even though most systems are designed to 
prevent and detect errors, errors can occur because of defects in the sys­
tem’s development or incorrect or improper system modifications. Em­
bedded audit modules provide the auditor with an independent check on 
the performance of the application system and provide an opportunity for 
timely corrective action.
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A u d it D isa d v a n ta g e s
Currently, embedded audit modules are not widely used, for the following 
reasons:
• The time, effort, and resources required to build and maintain 
them can be substantial.
• They must be protected against unauthorized modifications.
• They normally must be built during the development of a new 
system; failure to do so will significantly increase their costs at a 
later date.
• Because of the interrelationships between the module and the 
application, modification of the application typically requires 
modifying the audit module.
• They require a high level of data processing/programming skills; 
use of EDI standards, EDI software, and database structures re­
quires specific technical knowledge.
The reengineering of business processes and systems that occurs during 
the EDI implementation may provide the auditor with the opportunity to 
include embedded audit modules in these reengineered systems. Con­
sequently, their use should increase in the future.
Concurrent Audit Tool 
In tro d u c tio n
In general, a concurrent audit tool is similar to an embedded audit mod­
ule in that it inspects the transaction as it takes place. The main difference 
is that it is designed and controlled by the auditor and linked into the orga­
nization’s information system rather than being part of the system.
A u d it A d v a n ta g e s
A concurrent audit tool allows an auditor to test the client’s controls while 
a transaction is being processed without disrupting the client’s normal 
operations. The concurrent audit tool can be linked into the system for a 
period of time to perform tests and provide audit evidence for the auditor.
In a situation where the client has weak controls, a concurrent audit tool 
gives the auditor the opportunity to perform analytical procedures and 
substantive testing, because the data has been captured by the tool. When 
the client controls are strong, the auditor can also use the tool for the test­
ing of controls.
One of the advantages of this tool, in contrast to the ITF and embedded 
audit module, is the fact that it is designed and controlled by the auditor. 
As a result, the potential for unauthorized modification is reduced.
The use of a concurrent audit tool is illustrated in the following example.
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Example 2 — An example of using a concurrent audit tool would be to test 
invoices in the client’s purchasing process. All invoice messages are inter­
cepted and copied by the auditor’s computer (pre-translation) before being 
passed back to the organization’s system for processing. The auditor could 
select a random sample on invoice numbers and choose all invoices/mes­
sages over a predetermined amount. The concurrent audit tool then verifies 
the previously received shipment as well as the receipt record and the 
amount payable (if reflected by the client). If the client does not show the 
payable, further investigation by the auditor is required. Such an investiga­
tion could include reviewing the suspense files.
The total number of intercepted messages (in this case, invoices) is 
counted and compared with the total updates in the client’s related database 
(in this case, accounts payable) for the period the auditor tested. 
Discrepancies between the amount the auditor expects to be reflected in the 
client’s records and the amount actually recorded provides evidence about 
how well the system operates and the accuracy and completeness of the bal­
ance. These analytical procedures or relationship checks will provide per­
suasive evidence, because the auditor has evidence of the messages received 
and has followed them through the entire application/database.3
A u d it D isa d v a n ta g e s
In general, the disadvantages are similar to those of embedded audit modules.
Confirmations
Confirmations may also be performed electronically between the auditor 
and the client’s trading partners. To work successfully, however, trading- 
related applications may need to be modified to automatically retrieve the 
requested information, format it in an EDI transaction set, and transmit it 
to the requesting auditor. The development of EDI confirmation transac­
tions depends, to a large extent, on the relevance of confirmations in future 
audits. In an integrated EDI environment, where the higher velocity of 
transactions could result in immaterial receivable and payable balances, 
confirmations may be unnecessary. Subsequent payment review would 
probably be more efficient.
CONCLUSIONS
As mentioned throughout this study, EDI will likely have a significant 
impact on how organizations conduct their business and is not a technical 
replacement for a paper-based system. EDI will, for example —
3. Ibid., p. 39.
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• Change the business relationship between purchaser and supplier.
• Facilitate purchasing strategies, such as JIT inventory purchasing.
• Increase the reliance of management on increasingly sophisticat­
ed and complex computer systems, thereby increasing the need 
for strong controls over the computer systems on which manage­
ment depends.
There are also a number of standards that organizations need to be 
aware of in implementing EDI, including —
• Data retention standards.
• Evidence standards.
• Legal agreement standards.
• Data structure standards.
The impact of EDI on an auditor can also be significant, especially if the 
auditor has traditionally used a paper-based substantive approach. There 
are, however, no boilerplate instructions that can be given for auditing an 
integrated EDI system. Rather, the auditor needs to apply professional 
judgment to each client organization. Therefore, this study provides practi­
cal guidance for the auditor in developing a strategy to audit in such an 
environment.
A ppendix
Brief History of EDI1
This appendix provides a brief history o f EDI development in North America.
Y ear Event
1968 The San Francisco and Los Angeles Clearing Houses convene
a committee to study the exchange of paperless entries 
among banks as a way to cope with growing check vol­
ume. Ten California banks form the Special Committee on 
Paperless Entries (SCOPE) to recommend specific proce­
dures for paperless payments and deposits through such 
methods as the exchange of magnetic tapes. Transportation 
industry forms the Transportation Data Co-ordinating Com­
mittee (TDCC), having recognized the problem of communi­
cating with different formats, protocols, and line speeds. 
TDCC begins to design the basic logic for a system of elec­
tronic messages for the transportation industry.
early
1970s National Data Corporation and others establish computer ser­
vice bureaus.
1970 American Bankers Association forms the Monetary and Pay­
ments System Committee to address the needs of the pay­
ments system. It recommends industry standards and a 
comprehensive nationwide settlement system of paperless 
entries.
1971 Several Atlanta banks form a Committee on Paperless Entries 
(COPE).
1. Much of this data has been taken from Electronic Data Interchange a n d  Corporate Trade 
Payments (Morristown, NJ: Financial Executives Research Foundation, 1988), pp. 7-10, and 
“The History of Canadian EDI,” EDI Forum, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Oak Park, IL: EDI Group, Ltd.), 
pp. 73-77.
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1972
1973
mid
1970s
Year
1975
1976
1978
1978/
1979
Event
The San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank and its Los Angeles 
branch start to operate the first automated clearinghouse.
National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA) is 
formed under the auspices of the American Bankers Asso­
ciation to develop a framework in which regional clearing 
house associations can exchange information on behalf of 
their member banks.
National Data Corporation, General Electric, and others 
develop systems within their time-sharing networks for 
banks to store and for customers to retrieve balance and 
transaction information.
Automated Clearing House (ACH) network begins to process 
Social Security payments. Other nationwide applications fol­
low, such as veterans’ payments and military payrolls. 
Insurance companies begin to debit premiums and pay 
claims to individuals through the ACH. TDCC (now the 
Electronic Data Interchange Association [EDIA]) publishes 
U.S. EDI standards.
American Hospital Supply Corporation (now part of Baxter 
Healthcare Corporation) introduces ASAP, a proprietary com­
puter order-entry system. Large retailers such as Sears, J. C. 
Penney, and K Mart develop proprietary standards for order­
ing from their suppliers.
Federal Reserve implements interregional exchange among 
automated clearinghouses. Six major trade associations in 
the grocery industry commission Arthur D. Little, Inc., to 
study the feasibility of electronic data interchange among 
food manufacturers, distributors, and brokers. The study ana­
lyzes how electronic communications could make basic 
ordering and invoicing functions more efficient. It recom­
mends the use of a store-and-retrieve system for communi­
cations and grocery industry adaptation of the TDCC mes­
sage format system.
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) forms 
Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X 12 to develop uni­
form, variable-length, cross-industry standards. It builds on 
the message format system developed by the TDCC. Federal 
Reserve begins processing debits through the night process­
ing cycle, allowing companies to make deposits in outlying
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Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1984
1985
1986
Event
locations late in the day, provide their banks with instruc­
tions to move funds through the ACH, and have use of those 
funds in their central concentration accounts the next morn­
ing. NACHA Board of Directors appoints a task force to study 
corporate trade payments.
Uniform Communications Standards Committee (UCSC) is 
formed by the grocery industry associations that commis­
sioned the Arthur D. Little study. The committee embarks on 
a six-month project to develop EDI transaction set formats 
based on the TDCC architecture.
The Automobile Industry Action group, a not-for-profit trade 
association, is formed by members of middle management in 
vehicle manufacturing companies and their suppliers. 
NACHA introduces the first corporate trade payment formats, 
Cash Concentration or Disbursement (CCD) and the Cor­
porate Trade Payment (CTP). Banks begin to sell corporate 
trade payments though the ACH network as an alternative to 
paper checks.
Joint Electronic Data Interchange (JEDI) is formed to com­
bine dictionaries. EDI pilots are developed in Canada under 
the auspices of the Grocery Products Manufacturers of 
Canada (GPMC) and another by the drug industry.
ANSI X12 publishes first standards; ANSI X12 standards 
become umbrella standards for cross-country standards. 
Canadian grocery industry adopts modified version of UCS 
message standard (to allow metric trade).
Chemical industry commissions CIDX, an industry associa­
tion for the implementation of EDI. It adopts the ANSI X12 
standards and concentrates most of its efforts on implemen­
tation.
EDIFACT West European Technical Assessment Group pro­
duces an EDI standard that later became the basis for EDI­
FACT.
EDI Council of Canada formed.
General Motors announces a program to pay its suppliers 
electronically.
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Year
1987
1988
1989
1992
Event
U.S. Treasury Department starts a program to replace an 
annual volume of 80 million vendor check payments with 
ACH payments. NACHA implements Corporate Trade Ex­
change (CTX) format as a cooperative effort with ASC X 12. 
ASC X 12 and Grocery Industry Uniform Code Council (UCC) 
discuss possible merger. Warehousing Industry Network Sys­
tem (WINS) and UCC propose merging standards. ISO 9737 
(international syntax) approved.
First EDIFACT standard is voted on; strong support exists for 
United Nations-backed EDI for Administration, Commerce 
and Transport standard.
Canadian Inter-Financial Institutions EDI Committee formed, 
responsible for establishing standards for financial institu­
tions exchanging transactions with each other through EDI.
Canadian Payments Association approves Standards and 
Guidelines Applicable to EDI Transactions (CPA Standard 
023). These govern the exchange of EDI transactions be­
tween Canadian financial institutions that are members of the 
Canadian clearing system.
A ppendix
Brief Comparison of 
EDI Standards
This appendix discusses the difference between the two significant EDI stan­
dards in use today. It should be noted that EDIFACT is the emerging stan­
dard fo r  transacting business worldwide.
GROWTH OF TWO STANDARDS 
Why Standards?
In an advanced economy, standards for EDI are essential to enhance 
growth and use and to reduce costs. EDI originally developed along spe­
cific-industry lines, with each industry developing its own standards. As the 
use of EDI grew, so did the need for cross-industry common standards. 
The alternative would be for each industry to support at least three stan­
dards —  the standard for its own industry, the X 12 North American stan­
dard, and the EDIFACT European standard.
In the United States, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
created the Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X 12. Its goal was to 
establish EDI standards that would cross all industry segments. Various 
subcommittees were formed to develop standards that would accommo­
date and consolidate industry standards; their overall goal was to emerge 
with one common, generic, public standard. X 12 became the pervasive 
standard in North America.
Because international commerce requires fast, efficient, and accurate 
information, ideally there should be a single set of EDI standards covering 
all EDI message types. EDIFACT (United Nations/EDI for Administration, 
Commerce and Transport) has been developed as a specific solution to 
these universal requirements (also addressed by ANSI). This standard, pro­
moted by the UN, has been adopted in many parts of the world and is 
expected to eventually become the predominant standard.
The integration of international trade (NAFTA, the European Union, etc.) 
will further necessitate the use of one common standard worldwide. As it 
now stands, X 12 is mature and relatively more stable than EDIFACT. EDI-
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FACT, however, is catching up. Ultimately, it is anticipated that X 12 will 
migrate to or merge with EDIFACT. A survey of industry membership has 
determined that some 70 percent are in favor of one common standard for 
worldwide trade. The ultimate objective would be to establish EDIFACT as 
the common standard.
STANDARDS COMPARISON 
X 1 2
The EDI electronic envelope at the interchange level is a package con­
taining one or more documents, such as purchase orders and invoice pay­
ments, grouped into functional applications. It was discussed in chapter 2 
and is composed of —
• Headers and trailers to provide basic control structure.
• A functional group (one or more transaction sets of a similar 
nature).
• A transaction set (one complete electronic document).
The ANSI X 12 Standard Code for Headers and Trailers as shown in the 
envelope are as follows:
• ISA —  Header Start Interchange
• IEA —  Trailer End Interchange
• GS —  Header Start Functional Group
• GE —  Trailer End Functional Group
• ST —  Header Start Detail Segment (Message)
• SE —  Trailer End Detail Segment
The control codes trigger the beginning or the end of an item, so there 
is a predetermined and controlled flow of data items.
EDIFACT
The EDIFACT standard provides control features in the headers and trail­
ers of its interchange, functional group, and message envelopes similar to 
those found in ANSI:
• UNB —  Header Start Interchange
• UNZ —  Trailer End Interchange
• UNG —  Header Start Functional Group
• UNE —  Trailer End Functional Group
• UNH —  Header Start Message
• UNT —  Trailer End Message
The headers identify and specify the applicable interchange, functional
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group, or message, while the trailers serve as a completeness check on the 
corresponding envelope by means of total count and reference numbers.
The system of acknowledgments works the same way in ANSI as in EDI­
FACT. It informs trading partners that a transaction has taken place. In case 
of disputes between trading partners, the acknowledgment may also sup­
port the existence of a transaction.
SPECIFIC EXAMPLE 
Payments
An analysis of the current version of the X 12 and EDIFACT payment mes­
sage formats shows similar objectives behind the construction of payment- 
related information. The visible difference between these two formats is 
the X 12 treatment of aggregate information in one transaction set and the 
EDIFACT segmentation of the same information into several messages. 
The same types of payment information can be captured, if so desired, in 
either approach.
The following is a high-level comparison of the two formats for pay­
ments:
A SC  X 12  Version 3020 EDIFACT Status 91.2
820 Payment Order/ 
remittance advice
PAYORD
PAYTEXT
DEBADV
CREADV
CREEXT
REMADV
Payment order only 
Payment order and 
remittance advice 
Debit advice 
Credit advice 
Credit and remittance 
information
Remittance advice only
A ppendix
Control Considerations and a 
General Audit Program for EDI
This appendix provides examples o f  controls that are appropriate in an  EDI 
environment. The controls are discussed according to fin a n c ia l statement 
an d  computer objectives. This appendix also provides a general program fo r  
auditing EDI in an integrated environm ent assuming the use o f  a VAN, 
including an  illustrative work p lan fo r  testing controls over accuracy a n d  
completeness o f  inbound a n d  outbound transactions. These sample audit 
procedures could be used to obtain evidence that control policies or proce­
dures over EDI are operating effectively, thus enabling the auditor to assess 
control risk below maxim um . It should be emphasized that the procedures 
are not m eant to be prescriptive; the auditor should use professional judg­
ment to decide what procedures should be used in particular circumstances.
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CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS 65
UNDERSTANDING THE BUSINESS
This section identifies activities that an auditor should consider as the ini­
tial steps in the EDI section of an audit program.
Sample Audit Procedures —  Obtain a General Overview of 
the EDI Function
• Ascertain whether adequate segregation of duties exists for sig­
nificant areas, including —
• Authentication with access control and nonrepudiation.
• Database administration.
• Certification/accreditation.
• EDI users and the EDI security administrator.
• Document the internal system flow to determine which 
fields/processing phases/files are essential and how such items 
could be tested.
• Review the interconnect administration and procedures of data 
flow between VANs and trading partners for apparent deficiencies 
in internal control.
ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS OBJECTIVES 
Receipt of Inbound Transactions
All inbound EDI transactions are accurately received (communication phase), 
translated (translation phase), and passed to an application (application inter­
face phase), and  all inbound EDI transactions are processed only once.
C ontrol C onsiderations
• Edit checks to identify erroneous, unusual, or invalid transactions 
prior to updating application.
• Perform additional computerized checking (e.g., trading partner 
profiles) to assess transaction reasonableness, validity, etc.; con­
sider expert system front ends for complex comparisons.
• Log each inbound transaction on receipt.
• Use control totals on receipt of transactions to verify the number 
and value of transactions to be passed to each application; rec­
oncile totals between applications and with trading partners.
• Segment count totals built into transaction set trailer by the sender.
• Transaction set count totals built into the functional group head­
er by the sender.
• Batch control totals built into the functional group header by the 
sender.
• Sequential control numbers built into the interchange header by 
the sender.
• Confirm validity of sender against trading partner details.
• Use control fields within an EDI message at either the transaction, 
functional group, or interchange level (often within the EDI head­
er, trailer, or control record):
• Batch or hash totals.
• Sequentially number or record count totals.
• Use VAN sequential control numbers or reports.
• Assign in-sequence control numbers to all records received.
• Send an acknowledgment transaction to inform the sender of 
message receipt; the sender should then match this against a 
file/log of EDI messages sent.
• Log errors and/or rejects in a queue file and return an appropri­
ate advice to the sender.
• Generate exception reports that are followed up on a timely basis.
• Ensure that duplicate transactions are controlled and reviewed.
• Use edit checks (e.g., reasonableness) within EDI software.
• Provide an electronic audit trail for accountability and tracking.
• Ensure that the system will prevent the overriding or bypassing of 
data editing.
• Ensure EDI has an electronic interface with the payment system.
• Have supervisors review sensitive transactions.
• Arrange for security over temporary files and data transfer to 
ensure that inbound transactions are not altered or erased 
between time of transaction receipt and application update.
• Perform reconciliations on a timely basis to prevent erroneous 
transactions from affecting the business.
• Maintain the number of messages received/sent and validate with 
the trading partners from time to time.
• Exchange control totals of transactions sent and received between 
trading partners at predefined intervals.
• In the processing of individual transactions, use control tech­
niques such as check digits on control fields, loop, or repeat 
counts not exceeded.
Sam ple Audit Procedures —  Inbound T ransactions
• Confirm validity of sender against trading partner details (see ac­
companying sample work plan).
• Review security over temporary files and data transfer (see 
accompanying sample work plan).
• Review error recovery procedures.
• Examine EDI sequence control process.
• Test batch or hash total processing to ascertain that it is function­
ing effectively.
• Sample error processing and advice notification.
• Test for duplicate entries, fields, and records.
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• Confirm separation of EDI user and security administrator.
• Identify and test any management overrides.
• Evaluate exception report use, items reported, and actual use.
• Identify supervisor approval of transactions and test controls.
Sample Work Plan
1. To confirm validity of sender against trading partner details:
Through interviews with systems personnel and purchasing management 
and systems users, and through reviews of system documentation, as 
appropriate —
• Determine how sender identifier is validated and where this occurs in the 
processing sequence.
• Assess whether this validation is adequate to prevent transactions with 
invalid identifiers from subsequent inappropriate processing.
• Determine how exceptions are reported and resolved and assess the ade­
quacy of these procedures to appropriately dispose of invalid sender 
identifiers.
• Determine how the system’s list of approved vendors and vendor iden­
tifiers is maintained and who has authorization to perform maintenance.
• Assess the adequacy of these procedures to ensure that only currently 
authorized vendors and their valid identifiers are in this list.
Through reviews of the access control listings —
• Identify all individuals who have access privileges to the system file of 
approved vendors.
• Compare the control listings to the names of authorized personnel iden­
tified above.
• Discuss exceptions, if any, with purchasing management.
Conclude on the effectiveness of this control.
2. To provide security over temporary files and data transfer to ensure that 
inbound transactions are not altered between time of transaction receipt 
and application update:
Through interviews of systems personnel and review of docmentation, as 
appropriate —
• Identify the data sets holding inbound transactions awaiting application 
processing.
Through reviews of the access control listings —
• Identify all individuals who have access privileges to these data sets.
• Discuss with appropriate systems and user personnel to determine the 
need for this access, and why and how often such access occurs.
Conclude on the effectiveness of this control.
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Processing of Inbound Transactions
File update processing occurs in a complete a n d  accurate manner.
C ontrol C onsiderations
• Generate an automated check of control totals to final file output.
• Generate an automated check of inbound file detail to final out­
bound file output.
• Flag and store rejected and partially processed entries.
• Assign record sequence control numbers to all inbound transmis­
sions.
• Use standardized default options assigned by users.
• Have an error recovery mechanism that includes identification 
and correction procedures.
• Deliver reports to appropriate areas for reconciliation purposes.
• Reject invalid transactions before corrupting files.
Sam ple Audit P rocedures —  P rocessing o f Inbound T ransactions
• Verify control total processing.
• Determine incoming files check to final outbound files.
• Review logs for rejected and partially processed entries to ascer­
tain that they are being identified and resolved.
• Determine the process to sequence and control inbound trans­
missions.
Sending of Outbound Transactions
All outbound-designated EDI transactions are accurately passed from
application (application interface phase), translated (translation phase),
a n d  sent (communication phase) only once a n d  on a timely basis.
C ontrol C onsiderations
• Use control fields within an EDI message at either the transaction, 
functional group, or interchange level (often within the EDI head­
er, trailer, or control record):
• Batch or hash totals.
• Sequentially number all outbound transactions, perhaps using 
unique sequences for each trading partner or record count 
totals.
• Use VAN sequential control numbers or reports.
• Match acknowledgment transactions (received from the trading 
partner) to the client’s file/log of EDI messages sent.
• Have error recovery procedures at each phase of EDI processing 
to ensure that transactions are corrected and reintroduced.
• Provide additional computerized checking (e.g., trading partner 
profiles) to assess reasonableness of transaction values, quantities, 
etc.
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• Use acknowledgments, transfer protocols such as check sums, 
and message authentication.
• Secure interim files to ensure that outbound transactions are not 
altered or erased between time of generation and transmission.
• Build batch control totals into the functional group trailer.
• Build transaction sequence numbers into the interchange.
• Perform reconciliations on a timely basis to prevent erroneous 
transactions from affecting the business.
• Maintain the number of messages received/sent and validate with 
the trading partners from time to time.
• Maintain an electronic audit trail for accountability and tracking 
(e.g., by recording event in a control data base).
• Exchange control totals of transactions sent and received between 
trading partners at predefined intervals.
• In the processing of individual transactions, use edit checks such 
as check digits on control fields, loop, or repeat counts not ex­
ceeded.
Sam ple Audit Procedures — Outbound T ransactions
• Review error recovery procedures.
• Examine EDI sequence control process.
• Test batch or hash total processing to ascertain that it is function­
ing effectively.
• Sample error processing and advice notification.
• Test for duplicate entries, fields, and records.
• Confirm separation of EDI user and security administrator.
• Identify and test any management overrides.
• Evaluate exception report use, items reported, and actual use.
• Identify supervisor approval of transactions and test controls.
Processing of Outbound Transactions
File update processing occurs in a complete an d  accurate manner.
C ontrol C onsiderations
• Generate an automated check of control totals final file output.
• Generate an automated check of outbound file detail to final 
inbound file output.
• Flag and store rejected and partially processed entries.
• Assign record sequence control numbers for all outbound trans­
missions.
• Use standardized default options assigned by users.
• Have an error recovery mechanism that includes identification 
and correction procedures.
• Deliver reports to appropriate areas for reconciliation purposes.
• Reject invalid transactions before corrupting files.
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Sam ple Audit P rocedures —  P rocessing o f Outbound T ransactions
• Verify control total processing.
• Determine outgoing files check to final inbound files.
• Review logs for rejected and partially processed entries to ascer­
tain that they are being identified and resolved.
• Determine the process to sequence and control outbound trans­
missions.
AUTHORIZATION OBJECTIVES 
Inbound Transactions
Only properly authorized inbound transactions are processed. This in ­
cludes the objective that inbound EDI messages are from  a valid trading 
partner a n d  that EDI messages contain approved transactions fo r  the given 
trading partner.
C ontrol C onsiderations
• Use control fields within an EDI message to verify the identity of 
the sending trading partner:
• Identification code
• Password.
• Control setting up and changing of trading partner details.
• Compare transactions to trading partner transaction profiles (e.g., 
check the quantity ordered against average, median, and mini­
mum/maximum order levels).
• Match trading partner number to the trading file master file prior 
to transmission.
• Limit the authority of users within the organization to initiate spe­
cific EDI transactions.
• Segregate initiation and transmission responsibilities for high-risk 
transactions.
• Use digital signatures, dual authorization, smart cards, etc.
• Require management sign-off on programmed procedures and 
subsequent changes.
• Secure programs from all unauthorized changes.
• Ensure that all payment transactions are logged to a separate file, 
which is reviewed for authorization before transmission.
• Segregate duties within the transaction cycle (e.g., order entry/ 
approval versus evidence of receipt of goods versus approval of 
payment), particularly where transactions are automatically gener­
ated by the system.
• Ensure that the EDI application will prevent specific types of 
transactions, such as those over a trading partner’s specified dol­
lar limit, from processing.
• Use digital signatures to verify identity.
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• Ensure VAN verification of sending trading partner (i.e., via an ID 
code) before accepting messages for the “mailbox.”
• Control report distribution.
• Flag and report rejected transactions.
• Notify transaction originator of the rejected transaction.
• Have input transactions generate advices that are returned to the 
transaction originator.
• Ensure that EDI transaction advices are sent and are properly 
reviewed.
• Approve maintenance forms prior to input.
Sam ple Audit Procedures —  Inbound T ransactions
• Test EDI report distribution.
• Review reject transaction processing.
• Confirm advice notification process.
• Determine that maintenance forms exist; note date of approval.
• Verify that dollar or specific transaction edits perform as expected.
• Review criteria for various levels of acknowledgment and ascer­
tain that they have been agreed to by the trading partners.
• Ascertain that any special editing rules that are important to pos­
itive or negative acknowledgment are well documented and are 
being used.
• Ascertain that the procedures for reporting irregularities and 
error/exception handling are well documented and followed.
Outbound Transactions
Only properly authorized outbound transactions are processed. This 
includes the objective that outbound EDI messages are initiated upon 
authorization, that they contain only preapproved transaction types, an d  
that they are sent to valid trading partners only.
C ontrol C onsiderations
• Control setting up and changing of trading partner details.
• Compare transactions with trading partner transaction profiles.
• Match trading partner number to the trading file master file prior 
to transmission.
• Limit the authority of users within the organization to initiate spe­
cific EDI transactions.
• Segregate initiation and transmission responsibilities for high-risk 
transactions.
• Require document management sign-off on such programmed pro­
cedures and subsequent changes.
• Secure programs from all unauthorized changes.
• Ensure that all payment transactions are logged to a separate file, 
which is reviewed for authorization before transmission.
• Segregate duties within the transaction cycle (e.g., order entry/
approval versus evidence of receipt of goods versus approval of 
payment), particularly where transactions are automatically gen­
erated by the system.
• Segregate access to different authorization processes in a transac­
tion cycle (i.e., ordering, receipt, and payment functions).
• Report large (value) or unusual (e.g., large variations in order 
quantities) transactions for review prior to or after transmission.
• Log outbound transactions in a secure temporary file until autho­
rized and due for transmission.
• Use computer-based matching between transactions at different 
points in the processing cycle (e.g., purchase order to receipt to 
payment).
• Use smart cards and/or PINs to identify authorizing organization 
or person where payment transactions are generated.
C ontrol C onsiderations —  A uthentication
• Provide a digital signature or similar method (e.g., message au­
thentication code, public-key encryption) with each transaction.
• Attach authentication to a document using standard document 
headers.
• Use a strictly controlled table of valid trading partner information 
(account number, credit limit, key information, etc.).
• Screen trading partners through third-party service provider.
• Use a message authentication code (MAC) to validate these trans­
actions.
• Log, promptly review, and follow up all transactions failing any 
validation.
• Provide exception reporting and procedures to detect and follow 
up authentication failures as soon as possible and before transac­
tions are acted upon.
• Use feasibility/comparison checks within applications and possi­
bly expert systems to review transactions and trading partners 
against valid profiles of trading partners.
• Where encryption techniques are used, establish effective key man­
agement procedures including encryption of keys when trans­
mitted; secure storage of keys (consider tamper-proof encryption 
hardware); and split keys maintained by separate employees.
Sam ple Audit Procedures —  Outbound T ransactions
• Test EDI report distribution.
• Review reject transaction processing.
• Confirm advice notification process.
• Determine that maintenance forms exist, note date of approval.
• Verily that dollar or specific transaction edits perform as expected.
• Review criteria for various levels of acknowledgment and ascer­
tain that they have been agreed to by the trading partners (see 
sample work plan below).
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• Ascertain that any special editing rules that are important to pos­
itive or negative acknowledgment are well documented and are 
being used.
• Ascertain that the procedures for reporting irregularities and error/ 
exception handling are well documented and followed.
• Review use of authentication techniques (see sample work plan 
below).
Sample Work Plan
Consider completeness and accuracy controls over transmission (for example, 
use o f acknowledgments, transfer protocols such as check sums, and message 
authentication).
Through discussions with systems personnel, purchasing management, 
and systems users, and through reviews of selected trading partner agree­
ments, as appropriate —
• Determine the extent to which acknowledgments, check sums, and 
message authentication are used to ensure accuracy and completeness 
of transmission of outbound transactions.
• Determine what other techniques management relies on for assur­
ance of accuracy and completeness.
Acknowledgments are EDI transactions that are created and sent by the 
receiver of transactions to acknowledge receipt of a transaction. Depending 
on the trading partner agreement, they may be used for each individual 
transaction or only to acknowledge that a transmission has been received. 
They may be used for all or only specified transaction types.
• Determine what levels of acknowledgment are expected from trad­
ing partners and for what types of transactions.
• Determine whether the client verifies all acknowledgments and 
informs trading partners of exceptions, if any.
• Determine whether such exceptions have been detected in the 
audit period and how these were resolved.
• Determine what check sums are computed as outbound transac­
tions are built and whether the trading agreements require the 
receivers to report exceptions.
• Determine whether such exceptions have been reported in the 
audit period and how these were resolved.
• Obtain copies of exceptions reported by trading partners for a se­
lected month in which exceptions were noted, and note evidence 
of appropriate review and disposition.
Message authentication typically involves some form of encryption or 
similar algorithm and a key, which the sender uses to process a portion of 
the transaction (for example, the amount element) and create a message 
authentication code (MAC), which is included in the transaction data seg­
ment. The key is known only to the sender and receiver. The receiver uses 
the algorithm and the key to repeat the computation of the MAC and com-
(continued)
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pares this with the MAC contained in the transaction. If they are not equal, 
the data elements (for example, the amount) received are not the same as 
those sent, and the message must be rejected and reported for resolution.
• Determine the types of transactions (if any) for which message 
authentication is used and what provisions are in place to maintain 
the secrecy of the keys required.
• Determine how trading partners report exceptions and how these 
are resolved by the client.
• Determine whether such exceptions have been reported in the 
audit period and how these were resolved.
• Obtain copies of exception reports for a selected month in which 
exceptions were noted and note evidence of appropriate review 
and disposition.
Conclude on the effectiveness of this control.
AUDIT TRAIL AND DATA RETENTION OBJECTIVES
Procedures exist to provide accountability a n d  to ensure that data are 
available as evidence fo r  the auditor.
C ontrol C onsiderations fo r R eporting, Logging, and Audit Trails
• Perform reviews of exception reports for follow-up of unusual or 
unauthorized transactions before they affect internal operations or 
decision making.
• Holding transactions highlighted as potential problems in a ‘sus­
pense’ file.
• Provide timely reporting and follow-up of suspense items.
• Secure temporary files from unauthorized access.
• Provide audit and management trails for reconciliation with trad­
ing partner acknowledgments and third-party provider reports.
• Define appropriate information and procedures required to rec­
oncile charges from third parties with transaction history on a 
timely basis.
• Log all transactions (and acknowledgments) at least in semiper­
manent media, preferably using a secure or nonupdateable medi­
um, protect transaction logs from alteration to retain a valid audit 
trail for audit purposes.
• Retain the standard document version (e.g., EDIFACT) as initially 
received for all transmissions (for legal purposes) as well as the 
translated version (for internal purposes).
• Maintain transaction trails as required for audit, tax (including 
sales tax), legal and regulatory, and other purposes; this should 
include critical transactions and events and changes to trading
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partner information and should be sufficient and in an appropri­
ate format and medium.
• Maintain a secure copy of transmitted and received messages in 
their interchanged image (e.g., X 12) for use in the event of dis­
putes.
• Build audit trails with authentication coding in each record to pre­
vent fraudulent manipulation of the audit trail.
• Retain logs for an appropriate period, recorded on a medium that 
is protected, secure, or write once (e.g., laser WORM disks or log­
ging boxes) or in optical form (paper or microfiche).
• Alternatively, give consideration to transmission of key data to an 
independent third party for retention in case of disputes.
• Ensure that the communications trail facilitates detection of trans­
mission errors, follow-up queries, and appropriate recovery.
Sam ple Audit Procedures
• Check that output can be traced to source.
• Review input and date stamping.
• Review report identification controls.
• Review and test procedures for logging, updating, and monitoring.
• Review procedures for transaction trail maintenance.
LOGICAL AND PHYSICAL ACCESS SECURITY OBJECTIVES
The general objective is that access to data  files, messages, a n d  programs is 
secure. As part o f  this objective —
• Logical access to all EDI a n d  EDI-related software is restricted.
• Physical access to EDI facilities a n d  equipment is restricted.
• Key functions o f EDI/EDI-related transactions are segregated to 
protect against fra u d  or error.
C ontrol C onsiderations
• Ensure that an adequate level of security is provided by the oper­
ating system and that key operating systems security features are 
enforced consistently.
• Make regular password changes, particularly for essential appli­
cations and key personnel.
• Adopt multilevel password systems to restrict access to master 
file records systems and applications software, etc.
• Log EDI system activity and log and review all on-line transactions.
• Provide an error-detection mechanism.
• Restrict the number of log-on attempts to a minimum.
• Delete log-on IDs immediately upon termination of employment.
• Log off automatically (terminal timeout) to ensure that terminals 
are not available for unauthorized use.
• Encrypt the password file.
• Have terminal acknowledgment that provides positive identification.
• Log, review, and monitor procedures for security violations or at­
tempted violations.
• Require a full log-on sequence after recovery from “down” status.
• For particularly sensitive functions (e.g., payment transaction gener­
ation, if use of passwords is not considered sufficiently secure), con­
sider using dual personnel IDs, smart cards, and digital signature.
• Ensure that data uploaded from personal computers are subject to 
the normal edit checking and validation that are applied to other 
input data and are reconciled to control totals of data generated 
from the personal computer; use “scripts” or other measures to 
ensure that only designated applications can be accessed.
Sam ple Audit Procedures
• Test password storage, display, and update procedures.
• Verify that EDI application allows data encryption.
• Review and identify controls for sensitive transactions.
• Review application user profile.
• Verify authority levels for sensitive EDI transactions.
• Determine that EDI system activities are logged.
• Verify EDI network operator access restrictions.
• Verify VAN security procedures and controls.
• Determine that the EDI application will generate transmission sta­
tus.
• Review EDI recovery procedures, error detection, and tracing of 
transmissions.
• Determine the use of a security software package to control log­
ical access security.
• Verify password procedures for disclosing, changing, encrypting, 
and monitoring.
• Validate the EDI user security administrator’s authority to grant 
and revoke access.
• Review EDI terminal time out and identification procedures.
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PHYSICAL AND LOGICAL SECURITY FOR 
SOFTWARE OBJECTIVE
EDI software, application databases, libraries, translators, a n d  utilities will 
be physically and  logically secure, backed up, an d  maintained.
C ontrol C onsiderations
• Use a software security package to maintain logical security.
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• Ensure that the software security package does not allow for 
shared passwords.
• Have the database reside in an environment secured by security 
software.
• Have access authority assigned strictly on a need-to-know basis.
• Ensure that EDI utilities are authorized to be used for production 
applications and are protected from unauthorized access.
• Have sufficient audit trails of the changes to identify users and 
uses of utilities.
• Have EDI translator programs perform message acknowledgment; 
ensure that any “unable to acknowledge EDI messages” require 
controlled handling.
• The EDI translator verifies message and identifies trading partner.
• The delivery control of libraries is handled and controlled centrally.
• Production libraries are separate from development libraries.
• Code and/or table deliveries are properly authorized.
• All system changes are properly investigated, tested, and 
reviewed.
Sam ple Audit Procedures
• Review EDI software and database security.
• Review database access and administrator activities.
• Identify library controls.
• Check segregation of duties.
• Test EDI library and development and testing controls.
• Review file protection and system change control procedures.
• Review EDI utilities that facilitate application interfaces.
• Determine that EDI utilities are restricted, that they identify the 
authorized user, and that they are tested.
• Test whether the EDI translator programs perform message ac­
knowledgment and identify trading partners.
OBJECTIVE —  BACKUP AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING
EDI backup a n d  contingency procedures exist a n d  are tested.
C ontrol C onsiderations
• Have adequate backup for all EDI files.
• Have a facility to recover the program and data libraries in the 
case of failure.
• Include program and data libraries in the contingency plan.
• Ensure that operational support staff is familiar with the recovery 
procedures.
• Ensure that users are familiar with the contingency procedures.
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Sam ple Audit Procedures
• Review EDI contingency backup plan.
• Identify significant roles, user participation, and testing.
• Verify testing process.
OBJECTIVE —  COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
O bjectives
• Ensure that each message is interchanged with the entity’s trading 
partner without excessive delay an d  without loss or duplication.
• Ensure that messages corrupted during transmission can be 
detected a n d  corrected or retransmitted.
• Ensure that communications media a n d  equipment are secured 
against unauthorized access.
• Ensure that transmission messages are retained fo r  an  appropri­
ate length o f time in an  acceptable medium an d  fo rm a t to provide 
protection in the event o f  a dispute.
C on trol C onsiderations
Security Controls
• Install physically secure cabling between terminals and comput­
ers and between computers and external communications connec­
tions to reduce the risk of illicit tapping.
• Protect communications controllers and multiplexers from unau­
thorized access.
• Apply an appropriate mix of controls using communications pro­
tocols and their associated security features and security features 
inherent in document standards.
• Use a secure network delivery service (e.g., X.400) compliant with 
the security standards, such as those set out by ISO.
Encryption
Use encryption, particularly for high-risk transactions, that addresses the
following considerations (at the industry level):
• Messages to be encrypted
• Segments of messages to be encrypted
• Algorithms to be used for encryption of data
• Effective key management practices to limit the capability for en­
coding and decoding messages
• Symmetric (e.g., DES) encryption versus asymmetric (e.g., RSA) 
encryption, depending on requirements
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• Encryption tools to ensure authenticity of trading partners (proof 
of end points)
• Whether encryption will be hardware- or software-based (hard­
ware encryption is recommended)
• When encryption is to be provided —  during transmission or trans­
lation —  and for how long a message needs to remain encrypted
• Use of a secure network is not adequate if applications at each 
end are faulty; therefore, end-to-end encryption, with data 
enclosed in secure envelopes, is recommended to provide maxi­
mum security over data and reduce reliance on network security
Verification
• Consider use of immediate message receipt notification, immedi­
ate reporting, and review of high-value/high-impact transactions 
or other control procedures for high-risk or high-value messages.
• Determine which messages require acknowledgment and which 
details are to be confirmed.
• Consider use of the following techniques for automatic acknowl­
edgment of transactions from trading partners:
• Hash totals and control totals
• Full content acknowledgment of messages received
• Basic (functional) acknowledgment
• Provide procedures to ensure prompt identification and follow-up 
on missing acknowledgments; when messages are not acknowl­
edged by the recipient within a specified time period, action 
should be taken by the sender.
• Check exchange control totals (of transactions transmitted and re­
ceived) with trading partners at predetermined intervals to ensure 
completeness of transmissions.
Operational
• Consider communications protocols used in terms of restart and 
recoverability to reduce the risk of error and delay.
• Address reliability of chosen network solution and capability of 
selected protocols to detect and correct errors identified (e.g., use 
of check sums, cyclical redundancy checks, message authentica­
tion, etc.).
• Consider manual backup procedures.
• Provide protection over dial-in modems and other communica­
tions devices; dial-back modems should utilize separate dial-out 
lines that are not connected to the internal PABX (PBX) and 
extension forwarding should be discouraged.
• Appoint or utilize a communications specialist and provide appro­
priate training to relevant staff.
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THIRD-PARTY NETWORKS AND MAILBOX 
STORAGE OBJECTIVES
Objectives
• Ensure that the mailbox facility  is secured —  both physically and  
logically.
• Ensure that the network software promptly identifies a n d  reports 
on corrupt, improperly addressed, an d  unauthorized transmis­
sions a n d  that these are followed up.
• Ensure that access to the network and  mailbox facility is restricted.
• Obtain independent confirmation o f  security provided by the 
third party and, in particular, the network a n d  mailbox security.
• Ensure that adequate records o f transactions interchanged are 
maintained by the third party fo r  an appropriate period.
• Ensure that fo rm al agreements with third parties clearly set out the 
terms, conditions, a n d  charges fo r  services provided a n d  identify 
the responsibilities o f  each party including (in the case o f  service 
providers) continuity o f service a n d  security o f information.
• Ensure that third-party providers m aintain a n d  provide appropri­
ate information to enable follow-up an d  checking o f the status o f  
interchange messages an d  the costs o f  third-party services.
C ontrol C onsiderations
Logical and Operational Security —  Third-Party Responsibilities
• Validate all users requesting access to the network before permit­
ting any access.
• Follow up authentication failures immediately.
• Log all dial-in access.
• Change all network-related passwords on a regular basis.
• Restrict access to authorized users via hardware or software 
devices (e.g., by using dial-back modems).
• Secure network mailboxes to prevent unauthorized access.
• Provide formal procedures for controlling third-party employee 
access to mailboxes, authorizing changes to passwords, and spec­
ifying the level or method of access to mailboxes.
• Provide the capability to redirect messages to another site as re­
quired (e.g., backup processing site) while maintaining effective 
security.
• Provide appropriate recovery procedures and a fail-safe provision 
for network and computer equipment in the event of failure.
• Ensure that computer operating systems used by third-party sup­
pliers have minimum security level, such as B1 (per “Orange” 
book).
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Network User Responsibilities
• Retrieve mailbox store and forward messages on a timely basis; 
the maximum time delay should be specified in the agreement.
• Consider regularly checking whether trading partner mailboxes 
have been cleared or using functional acknowledgment for cru­
cial messages.
• Consider encrypting data across networks, given that envelope 
headers will need to be unencrypted.
• Retain responsibility for administrative functions and do not allow 
the network provider to change passwords, trading partner setup 
and maintenance, etc.; the third-party provider should not have 
access to these administrative functions, which should be con­
trolled by a separate security module.
Third-Party Agreements
• If possible, users should obtain copies of independent security re­
views of the third-party network, prior to signing any agreements 
with third parties.
• Third-party service providers will normally provide their own 
agreement, which should include —
• Nature of services to be maintained, such as network and mail­
box use.
• Service levels to be maintained (response times, etc.) and back­
up and contingency arrangements to be provided.
• Rights and obligations of all parties, including liability for errors.
• Network and mailbox security, including requirements for tim­
ing of mailbox clearing; provision for management and audit 
trails.
• Provision for continuity of supply of service and period during 
which service is to be provided.
• Responsibility to provide software to minimize the risk of cor­
ruption or loss of data during transmission and when in storage.
• Independent third-party review (industry security) and access 
available for auditors.
• Charges for network access, transaction transmission, and 
provision for alteration to charges; jurisdiction in the event of a 
dispute.
Glossary of EDI and Other 
Selected Terms
ANSI (A m erican N ational Standards Institu te). A U.S. organization that 
publishes standards in a number of areas, notably computer-related 
standards and standards covering EDI. The most important publication 
is the X 12 standard, widely used in the United States, that defines stan­
dard document formats for a number of industries/applications.
A rchiving. Generally done for audit, backup, and security purposes, the 
process of sorting and arranging historic records, usually to maximize 
the space available in computer systems for current data.
A sym m etric E n cryption  (Public Key E n cryp tion ). A cipher technique 
whereby different cryptographic keys are used to encrypt (“scramble”) 
a message.
Audit Trail. A chronological record of systems activities that shows all 
additions, deletions, and changes to both data and software. It enables 
the reconstruction, review, and examination of a transaction from its 
inception to output and final results.
A uthentication. The process of ensuring that someone who has logged 
on to a service is a bona fide user of that particular service and is, in 
fact, the person the user purports to be logging on as. It is also used to 
validate messages transmitted from one computer service to another.
B1. A security assessment of operating systems specified in the U.S. 
Department of Defense document known as the “Orange” book, relat­
ed to how easily an operating system can be penetrated. Scaled from 
A1 to D2, where A1 is not penetrable.
Backup. A copy of all data and software stored in machine-readable form, 
for use if the main copies are lost/damaged.
Call Back. The EDI server system that verifies the validity of a dial-up user 
to ensure that the caller is an authorized user. The process often uses 
a password-activated call-back modem. The incoming line will be dis­
connected and the preset number for that user will be called back to 
set up data communication.
C oncurrent Audit Tool. See embedded audit module. Main difference is 
that it is designed and controlled by the auditor and is linked to (rather 
than being part of) the client’s computer system.
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C onfirm ation. A notification by the mailbox system, or EDI server, by a 
message or code, that a message sent to a trading partner’s mailbox 
has successfully reached its intended mailbox or has been retrieved by 
the addressee.
C onnectivity. The ability of a particular computer or network architecture 
to be connected to and integrated with incompatible systems. OSI and 
X.400 standards address connectivity.
C ontingency Plan. A plan to minimize disruption to a business and pos­
sible financial loss as a result of loss of or disruption to computer pro­
cessing.
C orruption. The loss or scrambling of data in a computer storage medium.
DEA (D ata E n cryption  A lgorithm ). The algorithm that forms part of the 
Data Encryption Standard (DES).
Data C om m unications. The transfer of data between distant computer 
processing sites/devices using telephone lines, microwave, and/or 
satellite links.
Data E n cryption  Standard (DES). A symmetric algorithm published as a 
standard by the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology 
in 1977 to encrypt and decrypt data. It uses a 56-bit key. Eight parity 
bits may be added to the 56 bits to form a 64-bit value for transmis­
sion.
D ata T ransfer. The physical process of initiating and sending data to a 
corresponding computer system.
Dial Back. See Call Back.
D ial Up. The act of accessing a network by dialing an access phone num­
ber or by initiating a computer to dial the number.
Digital Signature. A technique or procedure by which the sender of a 
message attaches additional data to the message to form a unique and 
unforgeable sender identifier. This may, in turn, be checked by the 
receiver of the message to verify the message’s authenticity. The tech­
nique uses a form of encryption technology called public key cryptog­
raphy. (The sender and receiver may need additional techniques to 
identify themselves to each other.)
D irect Transm ission (T ran sfer). Direct transmission of data from one 
host computer system to another (host to host); host-to-host transmis­
sion utilizes a public network or an intermediary means (for example, 
a mailbox).
D ocum ent. Electronic image of a form, such as an invoice or purchase 
order, that trading partners have agreed to exchange.
D ocum ent Standard. A standard format for documents that is agreed to 
by trading partners, usually in specific industries (e.g., automakers), or 
that may be designed to apply universally (for example, EDIFACT and 
ANSI X 12).
GLOSSARY 85
D ocum ent T ranslation. EDI software translates incoming documents 
using agreed-upon logic for computer storage. It translates documents 
into the format in which the receiving party wishes to receive them.
EDI (E lectron ic Data In terch an ge). The transfer of structured data, by 
agreed-upon message standards, from one computer system to another 
by electronic means.
EDIFACT (E lectron ic D ocum ent In terchange fo r A dm inistration, 
C om m erce and T ran sp ort). The ISO standards that will determine a 
unified international EDI standard.
EFT (E lectron ic Funds T ransfer). The generic term for sending payment 
instructions over a computer network.
E lectron ic D ocum ent. See Document.
E lectron ic Envelope. The technique used to send EDI messages. It 
involves placing a “header” in front of the message and a “trailer” at 
the end to enable recognition and authentication.
E lectron ic Mail. Interpersonal messaging. An individual using a terminal, 
a PC, or an application can access a network to send an unstructured 
message to another individual or group of people.
E lectron ic Trading. A full implementation of EDI, particularly the buying 
and selling process within an industry or common interest group.
Em bedded Audit M odule. Programs written and compiled within an ap­
plication program that perform audit procedures concurrently with 
application processing.
E ncryption . A technique for protecting information within a computer 
system, on magnetic media and during data transmission. An algorithm 
transforms the data to render it unintelligible. The process can be 
reversed to regenerate the original data for further processing.
Firew all. An electronic device that, by not permitting network traffic to 
pass through it, separates or isolates a network segment from the main 
network. It does, however, maintain a connection between networks.
Functional A cknow ledgm ent. An automatic response by the EDI server 
that a message, or batch of messages, has been received intact at the 
intended mailbox.
Functional D efinition. The precise purpose of the message (for example, 
invoice, purchase order). A specific, but nonexclusive term used in 
standards-setting.
Functional G roup. The identification of one or more messages of the 
same type; headed by a functional group header service segment and 
ending with a functional group trailer service segment.
Functional G roup H eader. The service segment that heads and identifies 
the functional group.
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Functional G roup Identifier. The identification of the type of message in 
the functional group.
Functional G roup Trailer. The service segment that ends the functional 
group.
Gateway. A point of interconnection between one electronic network and 
another.
H eader A rea. The portion of the message that precedes the actual body 
and trailer of the business transaction and that contains information 
relating to the entire message.
Identifiers (ID s). A unique representation that identifies individual users 
as they log on to a computer system (or network).
Integrated Test Facility (ITF). “Dummy” entity, such as a fictitious orga­
nization, established on a live data file.
In tercon n ect. The process of linking up two or more third-party net­
works. It usually involves mailboxes for message delivery between 
third-party service providers.
JIT  (Ju st in  Tim e). A process adopted by many manufacturers whereby 
stock is delivered a very short time prior to its being required for use 
in production. To be effective and reduce inventory holding costs, it 
requires an effective computerized production scheduling and record­
ing system, as well as a sufficiently advanced industrial infrastructure.
Key M anagem ent. The administration and change procedures for the 
keys used in cryptographic algorithms. It covers methods of generat­
ing, distributing, and storing keys.
Leased Line (D edicated Line). A line permanently assigned to connect 
two points, as opposed to a dial-up line, which is available and open 
only when a connection is made by dialing the target machine or net­
work.
Local A rea N etw ork. An interconnected group of computers, usually 
within small geographic bounds.
Log. The act of centrally recording transactions by the systems manage­
ment function of an EDI service.
Log on  (Log in ). Connecting to the EDI service by dialing the access num­
ber, entering the user ID and password, and then being authenticated 
as a valid user of the system by the EDI server.
MAC (M essage A uthentication Code). A generated code resulting from 
the processing of a data string and a secret key through an appropri­
ate authentication algorithm (for example, DES). It verifies that the 
data have not been changed.
M ailbox. A repository for messages in an electronic mail system or EDI 
server. Only authorized messages are allowed into mailboxes. The EDI 
server authenticates each message before depositing it in the appro­
priate “pigeon hole” of a mailbox.
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M aintenance P rocedure. The authorized process mechanism for requests 
for changes or additions to EDI messages, data segments, or data ele­
ments and related procedures.
M essage. An identified and structured set of data elements and segments 
covering the requirements for a specified transaction.
M essage Code. A unique reference identifying a message type.
M essage D irectory. A directory of standard messages. All standards use 
both these and data dictionaries.
M essage H eader Segm ent. The service segment starting and uniquely 
identifying a message.
M essage Standard. The sequence, attributes, and usage of data elements 
within a message. Used in all document standards (SWIFT, Sll A, etc.).
M essage Sw itching. The circuit routing and direct transfer of a message 
from one computer to another without any time delay service (for 
example, a mailbox) or adding of value.
M essage T railer Segm ent. The service segment ending and uniquely 
identifying the end of a message.
M odem. An acronym for modulator/demodulator; a device for interfacing 
communications equipment (for example, terminals, microcomputer 
nodes) within communication networks.
Network. An interconnected group of computers (including microcom­
puters) or terminals linked by a transmission facility.
O perating System . A collection of programs that control a computer’s 
internal functions. VAX VMS, MVS XA, MS/DOS, Macintosh, and UNIX 
are examples of operating systems.
Packet. A stream of data split up into uniform lengths with checking 
applied to ensure the completeness, accuracy, and order of the origi­
nal message.
Packet N etw ork. An electronic message-carrying system that allows one- 
and two-way communication between computers and terminals in dif­
ferent locations. Packet networks allow different kinds of computers 
to communicate with one another.
Paperless Trading. The process of exchanging trading documents elec­
tronically.
Parity. An error-checking technique used in programming and data com­
munication to ensure receipt of complete and valid data.
Passw ords. A protected string of characters or words that authenticates a 
computer user, a specific response, or an access type.
Polling. A method of controlling transmission of data by inquiring of each 
particular computer or terminal (in sequence) in a network if it has 
data to transmit.
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P rotocol. A set of codes that controls the transmission and receipt of data 
sent between various communication devices.
Public Key C ryptography. See Asymmetric Encryption.
Public Key E ncryption . See Asymmetric Encryption.
Qualified Data Elem ent. A data element whose precise meaning is con­
veyed by an associated qualifier.
Qualifier. An element of data that gives a qualified data element or seg­
ment a specific meaning.
Queue. A group of items (for example, jobs, packets, etc.) waiting for ser­
vice by a processor.
Receive (R eceiving C om puter). A (temporarily) passive computer in an 
EDI network. The computer receives or retrieves EDI documents, 
directly or via a mailbox.
R ecord. A collection of related items of data treated as a unit. Fields are 
the items contained therein.
Script. A program that logs a user directly into an application (or a spe­
cific menu option within an application).
Section C ontrol Segm ent. A service segment used to separate header, 
detail, and summary sections of a message where necessary to avoid 
ambiguities in the message segment content.
Security. A generic term generally describing the method adopted to pro­
tect data from loss, corruption, unauthorized access, and retrieval.
Segm ent. A predefined and identified set of normally functionally related 
data elements identified by the sequential positions within the set. A 
segment starts with a segment tag and ends with a segment termina­
tor. It can be a service or a user data segment.
Segm ent Code. A code that uniquely identifies each segment as specified 
in a segment directory.
Segm ent Name. One or more words identifying a data segment concept.
Segm ent Specifications. The contents, structure, and attributes of a seg­
ment.
Segm ent Tag. A unique identifier of a segment.
Segm ent T erm inator. A syntax character that is used to identify the end 
of a segment.
Send. To transmit data.
Server. The computer at the heart of an EDI system.
Service Segm ent. A segment required to service the interchange of user 
data.
Store and Forw ard. The term commonly applied to a messaging (for 
example, electronic mail) system in which a message is stored before
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it can be delivered to a third party. The term implies that the mailbox 
system itself performs delivery to the addressee, that is, direct delivery.
Store and R etrieve. The situation whereby a message is sent to a mailbox 
and resides there until retrieved by the addressee accessing the ad­
dressee’s own mailbox, or possibly, purged to an archive file if it lies 
dormant for a predetermined period of time.
Sum m ary A rea. The portion of the message that follows the body and 
that contains summary information relating to the entire message.
Sym m etric E ncryption . The situation whereby two trading partners 
share one or more secret keys. No one else can read their messages. 
A different key (or set of keys) is needed for each pair of trading 
partners.
System s A dm inistration. The function of allocating mailbox addresses, 
user IDs, and passwords and of checking security routines, bulk print­
ing, audit routines, housekeeping, statistics, and billing.
System s M anagem ent. The tasks involved in keeping a network in ser­
vice by providing access to valid users. It also involves security, log­
ging, provision of statistics, billing, and central services such as printing.
Telecom m unication. Communication between computers or peripheral 
devices in different locations. It often takes place over long distances 
and is usually carried out via telephone lines, radio waves, or a satel­
lite-transmission apparatus.
Third Party. A party, such as a VAN, involved in the trading relationship 
with whom the company is not directly trading.
Tim e Out. The situation whereby a time limit is established for a certain 
action, for example, receipt of a message; when the set time is exceed­
ed, the message is rejected and the end user is so informed.
Trading P artner. An organization with which a company establishes a 
trading relationship.
Trading P artn er A greem ent. A contract between two EDI trading part­
ners. It generally addresses, for example, EDI communications, trade 
terms, and conditions relating to merchandise returns and warranties.
T ransaction. A single completed transmission, for example, the transmis­
sion of a single invoice over an EDI network.
T ransaction  Set. The name given to a complete trading document, for 
example, an invoice, sent electronically.
T ranscription  E rro r. A mistake or omission in the copying of informa­
tion from one document to another, whether done clerically or via a 
keyboard.
U ser ID. A password and identifier that enables an end user to sign on to 
a computer system.
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U ser M anual. A document that sets out procedures agreed upon by two 
trading parties, including security arrangements, recovery procedures, 
and follow-up of unusual transactions.
Validation. The process of checking whether a document is of the correct 
type for a particular EDI system and whether it comes from or is going 
to an authorized user. This includes all of the editing and syntax check­
ing involved in standards conformance.
VAN (Value-Added N etw ork). A third party that provides network and 
store and forward (mailbox) services.
WORM Disk. A Write-Once Read-Many disk enables “read only” access to 
all users. Data cannot be updated or deleted (unless the complete disk 
is overwritten).
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